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ABSTRACT 
Radicalization to violent extremism is a critical threat to both national and global security. 
This thesis examines three aspects of radicalization to violent Islamic extremism and the 
related counter-radicalization efforts. The first chapter examines what motivations 
prompt women to radicalize to violent extremism and analyzes the applicability of 
several leading theories on motivations to four Western female case studies. In this 
chapter, I hypothesized that the women would exhibit motivations related more to 
political and religious drivers due to the relatively conflict-free setting and neutral gender 
roles in the West; however, the results indicate trauma/secondary traumatization and the 
associated revenge are significant motivators, and uniquely female motivations to restore 
honor should not be disregarded as a possible motive. The second chapter explores the 
characteristics that make leaders influential and critical to the radicalization process 
through a case study analysis of Abdullah Azzam and Anwar al-Awlaki.  I theorized that 
these leaders would demonstrate charisma, effective communication, and credibility 
despite being deceased, which the case study analysis confirmed with the exception of 
Azzam’s lack of cultural resonance. Using a case study comparison of three programs 
with different structures, the final chapter assesses whether a government connection has 
a negative impact on counter-radicalization programs, and if the type of government 
involved influences how the connection is perceived.  I hypothesized that a government 
connection, particularly with a Western secular government, would negatively impact a 
program’s legitimacy.  However, the case study results indicate that an apparent 
connection between the messengers and the government negatively impacts program 
legitimacy, not simply a government connection to the program as a whole. Also, the 
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case study results reveal the type of government involved does have an impact when a 
connection is evident between the messengers and the government.  Each of the chapters 
addresses policy implications related to counter-radicalization and specifically effective 
communication of a counter narrative. 
Thesis Advisors:  
Dr. Sarah O’Byrne, Dr. Rameez Abbas, Dr. Jacob Straus, Dr. Mark Stout 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Terrorism and the violent extremist groups behind terrorism pose one of the 
foremost threats to global security today. President Barack Obama recently stated, “For 
the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains 
terrorism.”1 The terrorist threat is evident from the homegrown and international attacks 
that have struck on Western soil – the Boston Marathon bombing, the Fort Hood shooting 
– to the spread of Al Qaeda affiliates internationally, to the European struggle to stop 
individuals leaving to fight with extremists in Syria, to the attack on the Kenyan 
Westgate Mall, and to the escalating attacks of Boko Haram in Nigeria.  These are just a 
few examples of the terrorist threat in recent history with a focus on violent Islamic 
extremism, which is the concentration of this analysis but is not the only form of 
extremism posing a threat. Given the prominence of terrorism as a global and national 
threat to security, it is critical to understand the radicalization process that precedes 
violent extremism and ultimately leads to terrorist attacks and to develop counter-
radicalization efforts to stop the spread of violent extremism.     
Radicalization, a highly debated topic, does not have an established or standard 
definition.2  However, it is often defined as an individualized and complex process 
through which individuals are exposed to an ideology and transition from what is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mark Landler, “Obama Warns U.S. Faces Diffuse Terrorism Threats,” The New York Times, May 28, 
2014, accessed June 18, 2014.  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/politics/obama-foreign-policy-
west-point-speech.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias& 
2 Lorenzo Vidino, “Countering Radicalization in America,” USIP Special Report, November 2010, 1, 3. 
accessed July 18, 2014. 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf 
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considered mainstream and conventional ideas to an extreme set of beliefs and ideas.3  
Radicalization includes both personal and structural factors, as well as a number of other 
components, including root causes and strains, ideology, and mobilization/socialization 
with a likeminded group.4 No single component or factor can explain radicalization, and 
no single profile or path exists to explain those that radicalize.   
 Radicalization ranges from cognitive - operating within legal means and limited to 
ideas - to violent - accepting violence as a legitimate means to accomplish extremist 
goals.5  Extremism is the end result of the radicalization process, and violent extremism is 
the acceptance and engagement in violent action as a result of radical, or extreme, views.6 
Violent extremism is then often equated with terrorism or terrorism can be considered the 
step when action is taken or supported.  Radicalization to violent extremism often is the 
focus of counter-radicalization efforts designed to stop terrorism.   
The issue of radicalization is important in a globalized world where people from 
around the world are connected and share ideas, particularly via social media and the 
internet.  The increased connectivity makes it more likely that an individual will be 
exposed at some point to an extremist ideology - by chance or choice, and also facilitates 
the exchange of information and propaganda and socialization with other extremists.  
These are important factors to take into account for countering radicalization to violence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Security Criminal Investigations, Radicalization: A Guide for 
the Perplexed, Canada, June 2009, 1. As referenced in Jerome P. Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism: 
Combatting a Complex Threat,” Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2013, 11-12.  
4 Vidino, “Countering Radicalization in America,” 3; Peter Neumann, “Combating Violent Extremism: The 
Counterradicalization Debate in 2011,” The Washington Institute Policy Analysis 1738. January 7, 2011. 
Accessed July 19, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/combating-violent-
extremism-the-counterradicalization-debate-in-2011 
5 Vidino, “Countering Radicalization in America,” 1. 
6 Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combatting a Complex Threat,” 12.   
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In the United States, efforts to counter radicalization to violent extremism are 
relatively new and underdeveloped.  The 9/11 Commission Report discusses efforts to 
prevent the growth of Islamist Terrorism, including engaging in the “struggle of ideas,” 
and engaging in a preventive strategy that incorporates political aspects.7  Although some 
efforts and programs to counter radicalization have existed since 2001, it was not until 
2011 that the White House released a formal strategy, “Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violet Extremism in the United States.”8  United States’ efforts to counter-
radicalization are still developing and evolving, and there are improvements that can be 
made as studies further the understanding of radicalization.    
The overarching theme for this paper is radicalization to violent Islamic 
extremism with an emphasis on understanding and enhancing those counter-violent 
extremism (CVE) or preventing violent extremism (PVE) efforts designed to combat or 
counter radicalization and undermine the terrorist narrative.  By understanding and 
potentially stopping or slowing radicalization, the source of terrorism would be greatly 
undermined.  Exploring radicalization and creating effective and legitimate counter-
radicalization programs and policies has gained new importance in the United States as 
terrorist attacks have continued to strike closer to the homeland, and in some cases, the 
attacks are carried out by United States citizens.  This paper aims to further the study of 
radicalization to violent extremism with a focus on the implications for Western 
governments, specifically the United States.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 National Commission on Terrorism Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, July 
22, 2004, 364, 375. Accessed July 18, 2014. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf 
8 “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violet Extremism in the United States,” The White House, 
August 2011. Accessed July 18, 2014. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf 
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Beyond the central theme of radicalization and counter-radicalization, I chose to 
explore topics because of their role in communication and messaging, both of which have 
a great impact on the success and the effectiveness of CVE efforts, and therefore the 
success of countering radicalization.  Specifically, this paper studies female motivations 
to radicalize to violent extremism, characteristics of some of the most prominent 
inspirational leaders of violent Islamic extremism, and the impact of a government 
connection on a counter-radicalization program.   Each chapter investigates understudied 
areas and cases, or offers a new analysis and methodology for previously studied topics 
to produce new information and insights.   
The subjects of each chapter relate directly to communicating a message 
effectively and with credibility to undermine the terrorist narrative and propaganda. I 
chose to study the motivations that prompt females to radicalize to violent extremism 
because terrorist groups use motivations to recruit individuals; therefore, these 
motivations should be used to inform counter-radicalization programs in order to stop 
these recruitment efforts with an alternate message and to maintain awareness of the 
audience.  The characteristics of inspirational terrorist leaders were chosen because these 
leaders have found success in encouraging individuals to act on their radical beliefs, 
primarily through the use of propaganda and their ability to communicate and connect to 
these individuals.  The study of leaders provides knowledge on communication styles, 
content for messaging, and how to establish credibility and attract or connect with an 
audience. Finally, the structure of existing counter-radicalization programs was explored 
because there are lessons that can be learned from the success and failure of other 
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programs and how they were constructed to communicate their message and because the 
analysis provides information into how to establish credibility.  
 
The Female Front 
 The first chapter examines the question what motivations prompt women to 
radicalize to violent extremism.  This chapter reviews the scholarly literature on female 
motivations and from the literature, it establishes three main categories of motivations: 
political, religious, and personal.  The analysis breaks down the personal motivations 
category into more detail and includes: trauma and secondary traumatization, revenge and 
grief, regaining honor and reinforcing gender roles, and struggling for equality to break 
from traditional roles.  Particular attention is paid to those personal motivations that are 
unique to females, specifically regaining female honor/reinforcing gender roles and the 
opposing motivation described as struggling for equality and a break from traditional 
roles.9   
Using a case study analysis, the chapter assesses the applicability of the leading 
theories on female motivations to four individual cases of Western female radicalization. 
Western female case studies were selected because they are an under studied population 
in the subject area and because they have the potential to truly test the established 
theories on motivations, which were founded mainly using select case study populations 
like the Palestinian female suicide bombers and the Chechen Black Widows.   The 
individual case studies explored in this analysis are Muriel Degauque, Roshonara 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 While regaining honor is not a uniquely female motivation on a broader and more general level, the 
subject of this chapter is regaining female honor, specifically female purity and honor related to the ability 
to fulfill traditional societal roles as mothers and wives.  
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Choudhry, Malika El Aroud, and Colleen LaRose.  News articles, court documents, 
media interviews, and police documents are assessed to determine the existence of or 
evidence for the leading theories on female motivations.  
 Based on a review of the literature, I anticipated that Western case studies would 
exhibit more political and religious motivations than personal because the West is stable 
and is not experiencing war violence at home and because Western women typically have 
a greater level of equality and freedom.   I also expected to find that the uniquely 
feminine motivations to radicalize would not be present in the Western case studies due 
to this greater level of equality and absence of rigid roles.   
The case study results challenged what would be expected based on the literature 
review on motivations. The Western cases possessed prominent personal motivations 
similar to those cases based in conflict settings with traditional, limited roles for women, 
for example the Chechens and Palestinians. The findings demonstrate the importance of 
personal motivations in the radicalization process, particularly the role of 
trauma/secondary traumatization and the desire for revenge stemming from 
traumatization.  Perhaps more intriguing, some of the Western case studies exhibited 
signs consistent with the theory on restoration of female honor, which is a theory 
primarily associated with case studies and populations with more traditional and strict 
norms and roles for women in society.  This chapter offers additional insight into the 
study of female motivations to radicalize to violent extremism and provides information 
that can be used to inform policy to prevent and counter Western female radicalization, 
specifically what motivations terrorist propaganda are exploiting to encourage individuals 
to act.  
	   7 
 
Battle for Influence 
The second chapter examines inspirational leaders within violent Islamic 
extremist groups and the role these leaders play in the radicalization process and 
ultimately in the survival of the group. This chapter assesses what characteristics leaders 
of violent Islamic extremism possess that make them influential and inspirational 
regardless of the time and place in which they operate, including after death.  Through a 
review of the literature on leadership, both of violent extremist leaders and leadership 
more broadly, three characteristics were chosen for analysis: charisma, effective 
communication, and credibility or authority. Criteria for each characteristic were 
established using the reviewed literature.  Based on a review of the literature, I argue that 
inspirational leaders should exhibit these three characteristics regardless of the time or 
place in which they are operating, even after their death.   
This chapter assesses the identified characteristics and the applicability of each 
using a structured, focused case study comparison of two inspirational leaders within 
violent Islamic extremism - Anwar al-Awlaki and Abdullah Azzam.  These two case 
studies were selected because each leader is deceased and has been cited as a source of 
influence in a recent attack conducted by a Western violent extremist. The cases were 
also selected because the two individuals are considered influential to the current violent 
Islamic extremist ideology and activity.  Since the methodology is a structured, focused 
case study comparison, each case is examined using questions based on the literature 
review and with the intent to provide the same information for each case to enable 
comparison.  News articles, interviews, biographies and the writings, speeches, and other 
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materials (e.g. YouTube videos, magazine pieces) of each leader were reviewed for the 
analysis.   
The assessment found that both leaders generally adhere to the criteria for each 
characteristic, particularly for charisma and credibility or authority, but the Azzam case 
study strays from the tenets on effective communication for a modern audience, despite 
his resonance with a modern audience.  This departure from the literature raises questions 
on whether the material is being repackaged and tailored to a modern audience or if the 
other characteristics are more important in connecting with followers.  The findings of 
the case study analysis have important policy implications for countering these leaders, 
particularly related to targeted killings and countering or preventing violent extremism 
efforts.  The analysis provides information on how CVE materials might be 
communicated to resonate and establish credibility with an audience and what types of 
information should be included, for example, to establish credibility. The findings also 
indicate that targeted killings will have limited success against inspirational leaders 
unless paired with an effort to address the enduring materials and message of the leader.   
 
Blame The Messenger 
 The final chapter explores the question of whether or not a close and evident 
government connection negatively impacts a counter-radicalization program’s 
relationship with the intended audience, and if the type of government involved 
influences how the connection is perceived.   This chapter assesses the literature on the 
impact a government connection can have on counter-radicalization efforts and the 
varying types of messengers that are considered credible to the intended audience.  
	   9 
A review of the literature found that the existing studies of counter-radicalization 
programs failed to examine if it might be the construction of the program’s connection to 
the government and the type of government that impact the program’s legitimacy.  This 
chapter addresses those gaps in the literature and examines credible messenger types.  
Based on the existing literature and the established gaps, it was hypothesized that a 
counter-radicalization program’s legitimacy is negatively impacted when there is a clear 
and evident connection between the program and the government, particularly if it is a 
Western secular government.   
Using a structured, focused case comparison, this chapter examines three case 
studies that possess varying program structures and are set within different forms of 
government (i.e. democracy v. governed by Islamic law).  The three case studies under 
review are: Quilliam in Great Britain, the Dialogue Forum in Denmark, and the Sakinah 
Campaign in Saudi Arabia.  As stated above, standardized questions were established as 
part of the structured, focused case study methodology, and each case study was 
examined using the questions to collect the same information and to enable comparison.    
 The case study analysis findings supported the hypothesis in some ways, but also 
clarified that it is the evident connection between the government and the messengers that 
negatively impacts a program.  The findings also confirmed that the type of government 
involved does have an impact on the credibility of a program when the government 
connection to the messengers is evident.  I was not able to control for the messenger type 
among the case studies, but I was able to determine two options that are effective and the 
structure of the programs that maintain their effectiveness. These findings are important 
to the improvement of United States CVE programs, specifically the structure of those 
	   10 
programs.  Government sponsored programs have the potential to maintain credibility if 
the program is structured to distance the program’s messengers from the government or 
to conceal the connection.   
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CHAPTER 1 – 
THE FEMALE FRONT: IMPETUSES TO EMBRACE VIOLENT EXTREMISM
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Women have historically been involved in violent extremist organizations; 
however, since the early 2000s, women have become increasingly more visible and more 
active as actors, recruiters, and supporters in violent extremist groups, particularly in 
Islamic extremism.10  The importance of women in violent extremist groups is 
increasingly evident as news surfaces of females traveling to support extremist groups on 
the Syrian front, as the Pakistani Taliban releases statements indicating that they have 
trained hundreds of female suicide bombers, and as internal Al Qaeda arguments emerge 
on the role of females in jihad.11  Furthermore, propaganda directed at women, such as al-
Khansaa, and web forums with increased female activity have prompted scholars to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10Bill Roggio. “Taliban use females in recent suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” The Long War 
Journal. June 26, 2011; Cindy Ness, “Introduction,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, ed. by Cindy Ness 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 2-3; Mia Bloom,  “Bombshells: Women and Terror,” Gender Issues 28 
(2011): 1-2, accessed February 1, 2014, doi: 10.1007/s12147-011-9098-z; Karla J. Cunningham, “Cross-
Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26(2003), 171,173, accessed 
February 16,2014, doi: 10.1080/10576100390211419; Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The 
Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006), 467, 
accessed February 1, 2014. doi: 10.1080/10576100600698550; Huma Yusuf,  “Female Suicide Bombings 
in Iraq: Why the Recent Surge?” The Christian Science Monitor, July 8, 2008; Katharina Von Knop, “The 
Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Studies in Conflict 30 (2007): 398, accessed February 16, 2014, doi: 
10.1080/10576100701258585.  In Bombshells: Women and Terror, Mia Bloom states “the percentage of 
women since 2002 in some countries exceeds as much as fifty percent of the operatives (2).”  Cindy Ness 
puts this percentage closer to thirty percent, specifically for secular groups (2).  Neither author references a 
dataset for independent verification, but the trend and general agreement on the increase holds.  
11 Miranda Prynne, “Women Seek al-Qaeda Fighter Husbands in Syria Online,” The Telegraph, January 20, 
2014, accessed August 10, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10583393/Women-
seek-al-Qaeda-fighter-husbands-in-Syria-online.html; CBS News, “Women Fight for Right to Join Al 
Qaeda,” May 31, 2008, accessed August 10, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/women-fight-for-right-
to-join-al-qaeda/; Huda Al-Saleh, “The Women of Al-Qaeda,” Asharq Al-Awsat, January 5, 2014, accessed 
July 21, 2014. http://www.aawsat.net/2014/01/article55326613; Augustine Anthony, “Pakistan Taliban has 
500 Suicide Bombers, Cleric Says,” Bloomberg News, February 10, 2014, accessed August 10, 2014. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-09/pakistan-taliban-readies-500-female-suicide-bombers-cleric-
says.html. This statement could be purely propaganda and exaggerations for the peace negotiations, but it 
still illustrates that Islamic extremist groups have embraced the inclusion of women, as do the examples of 
suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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begin examining female involvement and to call for more research.12  Academic 
researchers and government officials increasingly recognize that female radicalization is 
an important aspect of understanding and addressing radicalization and violent extremism 
more broadly; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has 
acknowledged this issue and recommended additional radicalization research specific to 
women to inform future policy.13  While terrorism and radicalization are widely studied, 
there are fewer sources that specifically focus on female radicalization and participation 
in violent extremism, particularly for females that play roles outside of suicide bombers 
or that live outside of certain conflict zones.14  
In this chapter, I assess the motivations that prompt women to radicalize to violent 
extremism.  I review several proposed hypotheses on female motivations to violent 
extremism, and I determine the applicability of these hypotheses to cases of Western 
females engaged in violent Islamic extremism, specifically the cases of Muriel Degauque, 
Roshonara Choudhry, Malika El Aroud, and Colleen LaRose.  This is a case study group 
currently missing from the literature on female radicalization because there are fewer 
Western cases to study and because most scholars focus on concentrated groups with 
similar environments or conflict settings, like the Palestinian women, the Chechens, and 
the Tamil Tigers. Since women often hold very different places and roles from men in the 
societies where violent extremism is prevalent and because extremist groups have taken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 CBS News. “Women Fight for Right to Join Al Qaeda;” Von Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s 
Women,” 406-408; Lindsey O’Rourke, “What’s Special About Female Suicide Terrorism?” Security 
Studies 18(2009), 681, accessed February 1, 2014. doi:10.1080/09636410903369084; K. Cunningham, 
“The Evolving Participation of Muslim Women,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, ed. Cindy Ness, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 93.  
13 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. “Women and Terrorist Radicalization Final 
Report.” February 2013, 3. 
14 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Rafia Barakat, “Strengthening Community Resilience against Violence 
and Extremism,” Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, November 2013, 4; Bloom, 
“Bombshells: Women and Terror,” 6. 
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the step to customize propaganda for women, there is reason to believe that women have 
motivations that are different enough from men to warrant specific research.  Many of the 
hypotheses for female radicalization are very specific to a woman’s place in society, and 
it is necessary to test these theories against cases from the West where women are 
expected to hold a more equal role and status in society.  This research on female 
motivations is critical for better understanding radicalization and for formulating more 
effective and comprehensive policies, both domestically and in foreign policy.  
 The following chapter is composed of six main sections, beginning with an 
assessment of the theories on female motivations to engage in violent extremism.  The 
second section describes the case study methodology employed in the analysis of female 
motivations, and the third section examines each of the case studies in depth with a focus 
on the applicability of the established theories.  The case study analyses are followed by 
an examination of the findings that many of the established theories are applicable to 
Western case studies and a discussion of how the applicable theories might impact policy.  
I conclude with final thoughts and future research questions on female radicalization.   
  
Female Radicalization throughout the Literature  
 Many theories exist on why females radicalize to violent extremism for different 
causes and groups, ranging from secular and nationalist groups to religious-based groups. 
There is no single overarching reason or motivation to explain why women radicalize, 
and it would be overly simplistic and inaccurate to attempt to create a single profile.  
Three overarching categories on motivations are found throughout the literature: religious, 
political, and personal.  Individuals often have several different motivations working in 
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combination, with no single motivation or type dominating the decision to radicalize and 
act.15   
Varying schools of thought exist on the extent to which men and women share 
motivations to engage in violent extremism.  One body of literature on female 
radicalization argues that men and women generally hold similar motivations when 
radicalizing to violent extremism.16 The scholars within this school of thought range from 
those who argue that females hold group level political and religious motivations to those 
that contend both sexes share similar personal motivations.  Cunningham contends that 
both sexes are active in violent extremist organizations for the same primary reasons, 
mainly for political purposes, and she indicates that emphasizing personal motivations 
“diminishes women’s credibility and influence.”17   O’Rourke states that both females 
and males share the same “general motives” with both motivated by a profound 
commitment to their community, but the differences are revealed in how a particular 
extremist group ties the political motivations of the group to personal experiences during 
female recruitment.18   Speckhard asserts that motivations typically differ based on the 
environment – conflict vs. non-conflict zone – not the gender of the individual.19 Most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 162; Yoni Fighel, “Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad and Female Suicide Bombers,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. October 6, 2003, 
accessed February 16, 2014. http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/167/Default.aspx; Bloom, 
“Bombshells: Women and Terror,” 11; Paige Whaley Eager, From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists, 
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008), 23, 210. 
16 Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” 186; O’Rourke, “What’s Special about 
Female Suicide Terrorism?” 681. 
17 Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” 171,186. 
18 O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?” 681-682, 684, 701.  
19 Anne Speckhard, “The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
31(2008): 1030,1032-1033, accessed February 1, 2014. Doi: 10.1080/10576100802408121. - Speckhard 
groups different sets of motivations together based on conflict zones and non-conflict zones.  Those in 
conflict zones are in a group with nationalistic, trauma and revenge motivations; whereas those in non-
conflict zones fit into motivations of marginalization, desire for identity and meaning, secondary 
traumatization and redemption. Speckhard also argues that women are less likely to fall within the second 
group.  I treat all of these as most of these as personal motivations that can obviously act in combination, 
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authors within this school acknowledge that it is not as simple as stating the motivations 
are the same or different because both sexes have personal and political and/or religious 
motivations for their actions.20 
Some scholars recognize that personal factors exist and can be unique to 
females.21  This does not mean that personal factors are the overriding and singular 
motivation for these authors, but they recognize there are differences. The personal 
motivations include: revenge, redemption/regaining honor related to societal norms, 
equality and freedom from traditional roles, and trauma.22   
A final school of thought contends that personal motivations are the primary 
factors that cause women to embrace violence, particularly for suicide missions.23  In fact, 
some of these scholars argue that women have more personal reasons for participating in 
violent extremism than men.24 Scholars within this school are primarily focusing on 
Palestinian female suicide bombers. For example, Schweitzer conducted personal 
interviews with failed attackers and found the stated motivations change from personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
but I do not find it to be as clearly defined in these groups; therefore, I analyze them separately in how 
applicable they are to the study of female motivations.  
20 Mia Bloom, Women as Victims and Victimizers, May 11, 2007, accessed August 10,2014. 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2008/05/20080522172353srenod0.6383936.html#axz
z2upcZNKlN; Bloom, “Bombshells: Women and Terror,” 9; Whaley Eager, From Freedom Fighters to 
Terrorists, 4.  
21 Bloom, “Bombshells: Women and Terror,” 11-15; O’Rourke, “What’s Special About Female Suicide 
Terrorism?”; Bloom, “Feminism, Rape and War: Engendering Suicide Terror?” in Dying to Kill, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005).  
22Speckhard. “The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists;” Bloom, “Bombshells: Women and Terror,” 
11-15; O’Rourke, “What’s Special About Female Suicide Terrorism?”; Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: 
Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, Pa.: Rodale, 2003); Eileen MacDonald, 
Shoot the Women First (New York: Random House, 1991). 
23 Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different 
Reasons?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(2008), 304, accessed February 1, 2014, doi: 
10.1080/10576100801925695; Yoram Schweitzer, “Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers: Reality vs. Myth” 
in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? ed. Y. Schweitzer, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 
2006; Adam Dolnik, “Critical Commentary on “Who are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?” Terrorism and 
Political Violence.  16:4 (2004): 847, accessed July 22, 2014, DOI: 10.1080/095465590899731.  
24 Jacques and Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?” 319, 321; 
Mia Bloom citing Yoram Schweitzer and Farhana Ali, in Women as Victims and Victimizers.  
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immediately following the attack to nationalistic and religious as the individual spends 
time in jail undergoing socialization and indoctrination.25  Jacques and Taylor studied a 
sample of men and women that spanned several different groups.  
The following assessment of literature on female radicalization to violent 
extremism will examine the four overarching categories with an emphasis on personal 
motivations, which have the greatest potential for differing from male motivations and 
providing unique insight for future policy.   
 
Political and Religious Drivers 
 Religious and political motivations to engage in violent extremism are not gender 
specific and are usually associated with group level motivations tied to the ideology. 
Throughout the various studies on female involvement in extremism, religious and 
political factors were cited but were most often in combination with a personal factor, 
such as trauma resulting from a nationalist struggle or revenge for a relative’s death.26   
Religious and political motivations were not enough for most individuals to take the next 
step towards violent extremism, particularly for suicide attacks.   
By definition, terrorism implies political motivations exist behind the violent 
extremist behavior.27  Many of the women and groups examined in the literature were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Schweitzer, “Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers: Reality vs. Myth” in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying 
for Equality? 
26 Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “Black Widows and Beyond: Understanding the Motivations 
and Life Trajectories of Chechen Female Terrorists,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, ed. Cindy Ness, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 106; Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: 
Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006), 444, accessed February 1, 2014. 
DOI: 10.1080/10576100600698550; Von Knop,  “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” 399. 
27 John Horgan. The Psychology of Terrorism (Routledge: New York, 2005), 84; Kubra Gultekin, “Women 
Engagement In Terrorism: What Motivates Females to Join in Terrorist Organizations?” Understanding 
Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological Aspects 22, no. 1 (June 2007): 168-169. 
International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed August 10, 2014). 
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part of groups fighting for nationalist causes – the Chechens, Palestinians, and the Kurds 
in Turkey; therefore, they had underlying nationalist or political motivations.28 However, 
Speckhard and Ahkmedova, studying the suicide terrorism of Chechen women, argue that 
political motivations alone will not motivate individuals to embrace suicide attacks, but 
instead the political aspect is an organizational level motive that gives the individual 
justification for their act.29  Furthermore, they assert that individuals who engage in 
violent extremism seem to be compelled to suicide attacks by trauma, grief, and 
hopelessness – personal motivations. 30   
 Many violent extremist groups are rooted in religious doctrine; therefore, women 
in these groups often cite religious factors, particularly martyrdom, as a motivating 
factor.31 Throughout the literature and case studies, religion appears to be a motivator in 
conjunction with other factors, but it seems that more than any other role, religion 
provides the resonating ideology or justification to an individual that is already in the 
process of or motivated to radicalizing.32 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 O’Rourke “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?”; Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “The Making 
of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” 443-444; Karla Cunningham, “The Evolving Participation of 
Muslim Women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Global Jihadi Movement,” in Female Militancy and 
Terrorism, ed. Cindy Ness, (New York: Routledge, 2008) 87-91; Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “Black 
Widows and Beyond,” 110, 112; Y. Schweitzer, “Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers: Virtuous Heroines 
or Damaged Goods,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, ed. Cindy Ness. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 
143; Anat Berko and Edna Erez, “Martyrs or murderers? Victims or victimizers? The Voices of Would-Be 
Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, ed. Cindy Ness. (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 160. 
29 Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” 444-445. 
30 Ibid, 444. 
31 D. Zedalis, “Beyond the Bombings: Analyzing Female Suicide,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, ed. 
Cindy Ness, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 52; Karla Cunningham, “The Evolving Participation of Muslim 
Women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Global Jihadi,” 93; Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “Black Widows 
and Beyond,” 111, 112. 
32 Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “Black Widows and Beyond,” 112. Cindy Ness, “In the Name of the Cause: 
Women’s Work in Secular and Religious Terrorism,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, ed. Cindy Ness, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 19.  
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 It is also important to note that religion and political factors are often combined.33  
For example, the Palestinians and the Chechens are both spurred by nationalist goals but 
each conflict is also tied to Islam and often the suicide attacks are linked to martyrdom.34  
In fact, the Chechen struggle was rooted in nationalist independence goals but evolved to 
incorporate Islamist ties.35  While these political and religious motivations are often 




Personal motivations are those driving factors that happen on the individual level 
beyond religious or political ideology.  Because personal motivations are specific to the 
individual, they are many and varied, but this literature review concentrates on four of the 
most often cited for female radicalization to violent extremism.   Two of these theories 
are gender specific: Redemption or Regaining Honor and Striving for Equality.  
Revenge and Grief   
Grief and the desire for revenge, normally as a result of a relative or close friend 
dying at the hands of the enemy, are often cited as motivations for women participating in 
violent extremism.36  According to O’Rourke’s analysis, women are more likely than 
men to have suffered the loss of a family member, but this difference is most likely due 
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terrorist groups using revenge to recruit women.37 Major Sutten states that grief and the 
related revenge are a “significant motivation,” particularly for those women who lose a 
“dominant male figure in their lives.”38 Speckhard takes this point further and states that 
individuals often engage in violent extremism, specifically suicide terrorism, to defend 
and avenge their communities to “make the enemy other feel their pain.”39   
Revenge is often associated with suicide bombing groups and is one of the most 
common motivations for the Chechen Black Widows and the LTTE.40 For example, 
Speckhard and Ahkmedova concluded through their study of Chechen women that 
revenge is the dominant motivation.41  While many scholars find this motivation to be 
prevalent, they recognize that revenge and grief do not operate in a vacuum and typically 
combine with ideology and beliefs centered in religion and politics.42 This is particularly 
true for revenge and politics or nationalist conflicts where many individuals are dying as 
part of the conflict.    
Trauma   
Throughout the literature, trauma, mainly from violence, is often cited as a 
personal motivation for women radicalizing, particularly for individuals that become 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?”  710. O’Rourke states that this difference 
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38 Major Marne L. Sutten, The Rising Importance of Women in Terrorism and the Need to Reform 
Counterterrorism Strategy, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff 
College (2009), 22. 
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suicide bombers.43  Trauma often overlaps with revenge and grief, but also incorporates 
trauma associated with witnessing societal or community-based incidents and not 
necessarily personal or a relative.44   Speckhard and Ahkmedova found trauma, often 
combined with revenge and support of a political cause, was a powerful motivator and a 
factor/weakness exploited by terrorist groups in the recruitment of an individual.45 
Trauma was found throughout studies on the LTTE, Chechen Black Widows, and 
Palestinian women.46   
Similarly, secondary trauma, or trauma experienced through an associated group, 
is often cited as a reason for embracing violence as a means.  Secondary trauma often 
occurs outside of conflict zones for immigrant populations, who identify with a group 
experiencing injustices.47  This includes individuals who access material on the internet 
depicting traumatic acts against a victimized Muslim population.48 The individual often 
identifies with the victimized population and therefore experiences secondary trauma and 
develops a desire to act in defensive of the population or for justice.49  
Regaining Honor and Reinforcing Gender Roles 
A prominent, gender-specific hypothesis on female motivations contends that the 
desire to “re-embrace gender societal norms” and to restore one’s honor or family honor 
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is a significant driver across diverse groups.50  Female honor is comprised of sexual 
purity, marital fidelity and the ability to fulfill traditional societal roles, such as carrying 
children.51  Sexual purity can be violated through sexual misconduct (alleged or actual), 
infidelity, and rape.52  Rape is often named as a factor in female violent extremism to 
regain honor and also as a motivator from personal trauma.53    Traditional societal roles 
involve the women’s ability to perform as a wife and mother, including bearing children, 
and whether or not she is marriageable.54 Divorce is also a source of dishonor because it 
implies the woman cannot or will not perform traditional roles.55  When a woman cannot 
fill these factors (purity, marital fidelity and traditional roles), it is often considered 
dishonorable not only for the woman but for her family.56   
Women who feel dishonored within these societies can be motivated to reaffirm 
their role and commitment to the community with an act of violent extremism.57  This 
motivation is primarily associated with women who embark on suicide bombing attacks 
with the goal of martyrdom.  Martyrdom provides the family and individual with honor in 
death, purity will be restored, and forgiveness will be granted.58   
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Lindsey O’Rourke, one main proponent of this motivation, argues that women 
choose to support violent extremism to reaffirm norms associated with their gender 
role.59  O‘Rourke examined female suicide bombing demographics, including marital 
status and age (an older age indicating an individual is less likely to get married), terrorist 
group rhetoric, and statements by failed bombers in her analysis.60  She confirmed her 
hypothesis as it related to martial values, but had less data and information on infertility 
and sexual honor.61  O’Rourke provides evidence that terrorist groups cater to this 
motivation with propaganda on the utopian for unmarried women who achieve 
martyrdom and in some cases the relatives of the women conduct wedding celebrations 
after the attack.62  
Scholars who recognize this as a motivation typically provide evidence from 
Palestinian suicide bombers, the LTTE Black Tigresses, Chechen Black Widows and 
rape victims who have joined violent extremist groups.63 Speckhard and Akhmedova 
argue that this motivation and the motivation for improved social status or the desire to 
escape oppression can be contributing motivators but secondary to others, such as trauma, 
revenge and political reasons.64  Barbara Victor examines the inability of some 
Palestinian women to fulfill traditional roles, but she focuses more on women resenting 
or acting out against those traditional roles, which is examined in the following section.65 
While seemingly different motivations, these two are in fact related and are very closely 
associated with the status and role of women in these societies.  
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Struggle for Equality and Breaking Traditional Roles  
An alternate school of thought asserts that females join extremist groups, often 
engaging in suicide bombings, as a form of feminist activism against traditional, 
“predetermined” roles, which the women resent and want to escape.66  Scholars within 
this school argue that involvement in a violent extremist organization offers women an 
enhanced social status or empowerment and respect in societies with strict gender roles.67 
These authors find that women are active in violent extremism to promote independence 
and equality between genders, particularly in patriarchal societies.68  Scholars arguing for 
equality as a motivation find that the patriarchal societies make women more vulnerable 
to violent radicalization because it is one way the women feel they can achieve equality 
in such a society. 69 
Scholars within this school argue that these women are trying to redefine the role 
of women in their community and trying to prove that they are equally dedicated to the 
cause and/or ideology through activities with violent extremist groups.70   Von Knop 
asserts that women have many of the same reasons as men for participating in violent 
extremism, meaning political and religious, but “gender-based oppression” and second 
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class status as women is a further motivating factor and a means for these women to 
pursue opportunities beyond the traditionally limited ones.71  Berko and Erez found in 
their analysis of failed female suicide bombers that women engage in suicide bombings 
to resist gender oppression and  “remove gender-based shackles.” 72  Many of these 
authors utilize biographical information and interviews to conduct case studies on 
Palestinian, Kurdish (PKK) and Tamil Tiger women as evidence of a struggle for 
equality.73  
One prominent proponent for this hypothesis, Barbara Victor, studies Palestinian 
women who engage in suicide terrorism, and she asserts that the women undertaking 
these terrorist acts do not meet and/or adhere to the predetermined roles for women.74  
Victor referencing the suicide attacks of Palestinian women calls it a “misguided feminist 
movement,” which regards female suicide bombers as liberated.75   As part of her 
argument, Victor provides evidence that suicide bombers who achieve martyrdom are 
granted a higher status within the community, and she conveys each woman’s story with 
a focus on the events or areas that suggest potential feminist goals.76  
 
 
Methodology for Analysis of Female Motivations 
 In this analysis, I utilize individual case studies of female violent extremists that 
adhere to an Islamic extremist ideology, and I examine the motivations of each of these 
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women to embrace violence as an acceptable means of furthering their cause or radical 
ideas.77  I assess case studies of individuals rather than a higher-level group analysis 
because radicalization is an individualized process that is best examined on a more 
granular level, particularly when trying to determine personal motivations.78  The case 
studies include an analysis of news articles, trial documents, interviews with relatives or 
the individual, police reports, and official government documents.  Each case study is 
analyzed to determine the motivations of the individual involved and the applicability of 
the established theories on female radicalization described above.  
 
 
Female Violent Extremist Case Studies 
 The case studies under evaluation were selected based on several factors.  Many 
assessments of female radicalization focus on the same case studies, for example Wafa 
Idris, the first Palestinian suicide bomber, or utilize case studies that conform to their 
hypothesis without any challenges or outliers.  For example, many authors choose case 
studies entirely from one population or group (e.g. Palestinian women), which makes 
them more likely to conform than if cases are taken from a variety of groups, and some 
authors seem to pick cases within a group that will support their theory.  In order to 
accurately assess the applicability or existence of the described motivations and to not 
choose case studies that would be bias or conform to a particular hypothesis, this paper 
analyzes cases that were not as widely examined and did not align with one author’s 
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hypothesis.  However, case study selection was influenced by the availability of 
information on the individual. 
For this analysis, I have selected four cases of Western female radicalization.  The 
literature on female motivations currently has a gap in examining the motivations of 
Western female cases in the same manner, or to the same extent, as the literature covers 
specific female populations like the Palestinian female suicide bombers, the Tamil Tiger 
Black Tigresses, or the Chechen Black Widows.  This paper also incorporates case 
studies with suicide and non-suicide attacks because many of the theories on motivations 
were written specific to suicide terrorism, and as the OSCE Report notes, there is a 
general lack of research on women outside of suicide bombers.79 
Examining Western female motivations will provide unique insight into female 
radicalization because they are not embedded within a particular society or citizenry that 
has distinct conflicts and issues experienced by the population in a similar manner.  For 
example, the Palestinian suicide bombers have similar issues and strains because they 
live in an area and environment where they are experiencing conflict with similar traumas 
and everyday issues.   Much of the literature focuses on these distinct groups of females 
in particular countries or societies that are experiencing the same types of trauma and 
conflict (e.g. the Palestinians, the Chechens), whereas Western homegrown females are 
experiencing these issues in a unique setting and in some cases completely removed from 
a group.  
Based on the literature reviewed, I expect to find that Western homegrown cases 
will exhibit more political and religious motivations with personal motivations acting as a 
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secondary factor because the women reside in relatively conflict free environments and 
have a more equal place in society.  I do not expect to find signs of the cases struggling 
for equality to break traditional roles, nor do I expect to find evidence of regaining honor 
and reinforcing gender roles due to the greater level of freedom and equality in Western 
societies.   I also do not expect to find revenge as a strong motivator or trauma related to 
conflict because the Western cases reside in stable countries without large-scale internal 
violence.   
 
Western Violent Extremists 
Muriel Degauque – Belgian Convert and Suicide Bomber 
 Muriel Degauque was a 38 year-old convert to Islam, who became the first 
European female suicide bomber and the first known female suicide bomber in Iraq when 
she attacked a patrol in Baquba, Iraq on November 9, 2005.80  As such, she has been 
widely referenced but her motivations have not been analyzed to assess the applicability 
of the leading theories on female motivations to engage in violent extremism.   
Muriel Degauque is described as being “rebellious” with a “troubled upbringing” 
despite being treated well by her family. 81  She was from a small, traditional coal mining 
and factory town, Charleroi in Belgium, and she was alleged to have been a drug user 
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associating with the “wrong crowd.”82  Degauque joined a motorcycle club with her older 
brother, but local accounts assert that her rebellious behavior became worse and her life 
was significantly impacted after her brother died in a motorcycle accident.83  She was 
even reported to have said she should have died instead of him.84  During this troubled 
time, she married a Turkish man, but was divorced two years later.85  According to some 
media reports, she then met an Algerian man who introduced her to Islam, which her 
family is reported to have been pleased with initially because it made her stop drinking 
and doing drugs.86 
 A few years later, Degauque met and married Hissam/Issam Goris, a Moroccan 
born Belgian credited with influencing Degauque’s extremist beliefs.87 She traveled to 
Morocco with Goris, where she is said to have studied Arabic and the Koran, before 
returning to Brussels.88  It was during her time with Goris that she became estranged from 
her family and became more radical.89     
Accounts state that Muriel progressed from a moderate convert to an individual 
embracing an extreme interpretation of Islam with strict rules for Islamic customs, 
including men and women eating separately, no television, and fully covering her body.90  
Muriel’s mother, Liliane Degauque, describes how her daughter took her conversion to 
the extreme, “Muriel became more Muslim than a Muslim.  When she first converted she 
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wore a simple veil. But with her last husband she wore a [head to toe] chador."91 Muriel’s 
parents believe she was brainwashed, and conveyed that they were estranged from her.92    
Outside of Degauque’s religious conversion and strict adherence to ultra-
conservative customs none of the accounts of Muriel indicate political or religious 
motivations.  Based on media accounts, her radicalization to violent extremism seems to 
be primarily based on personal motivations. This must be viewed with caution since there 
are no available personal accounts from Degauque.  She is associated with three 
motivations that are widely studied for suicide bombers, which was her ultimate act of 
violent extremism.   
Degauque experienced trauma and grief with the loss of her brother, which was 
described as greatly impacting her and marking a significant change in her behavior.  The 
grief associated with this event is not traditional in the sense that it was not at the hands 
of an enemy, but it was the result of losing a significant male figure in her life.  Also, the 
trauma resulting from her brother’s death was not from conflict or violence as described 
for the trauma theory, but it clearly had a great impact on her life after that point.  
Furthermore, Degauque showed signs consistent with the theory on regaining 
honor and reinforcing gender roles.  Her past was filled with acts and behavior that could 
be interpreted as dishonorable. Her divorce from her first husband meets the definition of 
female dishonor as described for traditional societies in the established theory and it took 
place after her conversion to Islam.  Her divorce was not described as a life-altering event 
or a source of shame, but shortly after she did meet her second husband and adopt an 
extremely conservative interpretation of Islam.  Degauque also engaged in rebellious 
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behavior, including drugs and alcohol usage, which does not directly reflect the defined 
sense of dishonor as described in the theory, but does present a new potential source of 
dishonor reflecting behavior outside of accepted societal norms.  This is particularly true 
given her upbringing in a traditional coal and factory town.   
In the theory on female restoration of honor and embracing gender roles, 
O’Rourke briefly examines Degauque’s case and argues that if Degauque resents “the 
gender norms of any society, it would be the Western gender-neutral norms embraced by 
Belgium, not the gender-specific norms of Iraqi society.”93 Based on the findings of the 
case study, I do not agree that Degauque necessarily resented Western norms, but instead 
I believe she might have felt underlying pressure for elements of traditional female honor 
even in the West.  Particularly, since she was from a traditional and relatively 
conservative coal town. She goes from one extreme to another with rebellious behavior 
followed by her embrace of a strict and extreme form of Islam, and eventually her suicide 
bombing.  I would also argue that despite the West having a more neutral stance on 
gender norms, there are still behaviors that are considered outside of societal norms and 
Degauque could have been trying to restore her honor within these norms.   
 
Roshonara Choudhry – Third Generation British Citizen of Bangladeshi Origin 
 Roshonara Choudhry is a British born citizen, who stabbed and attempted to 
murder Member of Parliament (MP) Stephen Timms on May 4, 2010 in London.94  
Choudhry is a third generation British citizen from a moderate Muslim family of 
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Bangladeshi origin.95  She had a stable and normal childhood, and she was a successful 
student enrolled in King’s College and volunteering as a mentor on the weekends.96  At 
the time of the attack, Choudhry’s father was unemployed and under some financial 
strain.97 
 In 2009, Choudhry began following the materials and videos of Anwar al-Awlaki, 
who advocated violent attacks to stop the atrocities and oppression of the West against 
Muslims, and she appears to have radicalized over a six-month period from November 
2009 to May 2010.98  Choudhry also viewed videos on what she refers to as the resistance 
in Afghanistan and Iraq and a video from Sheikh Abdullah Azzam that asserted that 
women have a responsibility and duty to fight along with men.99  She is adamant that she 
did not interact with others during her radicalization, and the police investigation 
supports this because no contacts or communication were found.100  In April 2010, 
shortly before the attack, Choudhry dropped out of school due to her school’s counter-
radicalization department and the granting of an award to Israeli President Shimon Peres, 
both of which she considered working against Muslims and against her religion.101  
Roshonara Choudhry conveyed in her testimony and police interview that she was 
upset about the wars in Iraq and the treatment of Muslims in Iraq and Palestine.102 She 
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states, “I feel like it's worth it because millions of Iraqis are suffering and I should do 
what I can to help them and not just be inactive and do nothing while they suffer.”103 She 
also affirms that she had a duty to fulfill to other Muslims and she wanted to become a 
martyr.104  Her testimony and statements indicate that she was motivated by secondary 
traumatization from the videos and images she viewed of casualties and Iraqi prisons and 
revenge for oppressed Muslims.105  
Choudhry’s secondary traumatization is the result of her association with 
victimized and oppressed Muslims that she viewed in online videos and images.  Her 
secondary traumatization conforms to the concept of secondary traumatization as outlined 
in the literature review.  Furthermore, Choudhry’s revenge aligns with Speckhard’s 
theory that individuals engage in violent extremism to defend and avenge their 
communities, but her community in this case is her association with victimized Muslims 
viewed via the internet.106  Her desire for revenge stems from her secondary 
traumatization.   
Choudhry also indicated that she was motivated to act for political and religious 
reasons.  Choudhry strongly disapproved of the Iraq War and chose her target based on 
his vote for the war.  She also was moved by what she conveys as a religious duty.  She 
described herself as always being “quite religious” but indicated that she became very 
involved in religion after coming across al-Awlaki’s online materials.107 The police 
interviews reveal that her political and religious motivations stem from her viewing of al-
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Awlaki’s materials and her realization that she had to defend fellow Muslims.108  She 
states that she did not have strong political and religious views against the Iraq war until 
she had this realization, which implies that her political and religious motivations were 
interconnected with her personal reasons.  Choudhry does not appear to conform to any 
of the uniquely female theories on motivation.   
 
Malika El-Aroud – Belgian Jihadist 
 Malika El-Aroud, a Belgian woman of Moroccan origin, is an Al Qaeda middle 
manager, who ran a website supporting Al Qaeda and linked Belgian and French recruits 
with Al Qaeda Central.109 She is unique in the case studies because she is the only 
individual who spent time in a conflict zone with Al Qaeda operatives, and she is the 
widow of a martyr.  Also, unlike the other case studies, she is a recruiter and inspirational 
leader rather than a violent actor.110   
El-Aroud grew up in a Muslim family, where her parents required her to wear a 
veil, but she rebelled throughout her youth, including by wearing inappropriate attire.111  
At the age of eighteen, she married a Moroccan man and began frequenting nightclubs, 
sleeping at random apartments and showering in public bathrooms.112  During this time, 
she was jobless and even attempted suicide.113  She eventually became engaged to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Ibid. 
109 Elaine Sciolino and Souad Mekhennet, “Al Qaeda Warrior Uses Internet to Rally Women,” The New 
York Times, May 28, 2008, accessed July 12, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/28/world/europe/28terror.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&; Peter Neumann, 
Ryan Evans, and Raffaello Pantucci, "Locating Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle 
Managers," Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 11 (November 2011): 835, accessed July 22, 2014, 
DOI 10.1080/1057610X.2011.611936. 
110 Sciolino and Mekhennet, “Al Qaeda Warrior Uses Internet to Rally Women.”  




	   36 
cousin, who left her after she became pregnant before the wedding.114 As a single mother, 
in her early thirties, El-Aroud re-engaged with her Muslim faith taking classes at a radical 
mosque, but despite this, she had two more marriages that quickly ended in divorce.115 
Through the mosque, she met and married Abdessattar Dahmane, an extremist affiliated 
with Al Qaeda.116 
 Abdessattar introduced El-Aroud to the concept of “global jihad” to avenge 
victimized Muslims, and in 2000, he travelled to Afghanistan to a jihadist training camp 
and Al Qaeda compound, where El-Aroud met him in 2001.117  The two lived in 
Afghanistan until Abdessattar left in August 2001 to conduct a secret suicide mission 
killing Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Northern Alliance leader; El-Aroud did not find out 
about the mission until after his death.118  Following the mission, El-Aroud escaped to 
Pakistan to avoid being killed by the Northern Alliance; in December 2001, she turned 
herself into the Belgian Embassy in Pakistan and returned to Belgium, where she was 
charged and cleared regarding Massoud’s murder.119    
 When she returned to Belgium, she met and married Moez Garsallaoui, a Tunisian 
born extremist.120  The two promoted Al Qaeda online and administered websites 
supporting Al Qaeda with El-Aroud’s website (Minibar SoS) gathering more than 1,400 
followers as she wrote under the name Oum Obeyda.121 In 2007, they were both 
convicted in Switzerland for operating the pro-Al Qaeda websites, and in 2008, El-Aroud 
was arrested for her alleged role in a planned terror attack to strike the EU Summit in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid; Neumann et al. “ Locating Al Qaeda’s Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers,” 835. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid.  
119 Ibid.  
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid; Sciolino and Mekhennet, “Al Qaeda Warrior Uses Internet to Rally Women.”  
	   37 
Brussels.122  Finally, in 2010, El-Aroud was convicted of leading a group tied to Al 
Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.123  
 El-Aroud was motivated by a combination of factors that led to her support for 
violent extremism.  She had experienced secondary traumatization from associating with 
what she perceived as victimized Muslim populations.  This started when Abdessattar 
introduced her to global jihad in defense of victimized Muslims, and continued when she 
arrived in Afghanistan with Abdessattar showing her areas destroyed by war and poverty, 
blaming the US.124  The secondary traumatization led El-Aroud to seek revenge for her 
fellow Muslims.   
Also, the death of Abdessattar caused El Aroud great grief, which seems to spur 
her to support violent extremists even after her return to Europe.125 Neumann asserts that 
El-Aroud and Garsallaoui were “driven by the desire to avenge El Aroud’s former 
husband’s [Abdessattar] death.”126 This does not account for her acceptance of violent 
extremism prior to this point but explains her persistence in recruitment when she 
returned to Europe, despite her multiple arrests.   
El-Aroud’s past is filled with events and behavior that could be considered 
dishonorable and that might have prompted her to embrace an extreme and conservative 
version of Islam to recover her honor.  She rebelled as a youth, had multiple divorces, 
and gave birth out of wedlock. All of these factors would be considered violating female 
honor and societal norms as defined in the theory described in the literature review.  
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While El-Aroud did not pursue a path of martyrdom, her move to the most conservative 
and extreme interpretation of Islam and relentless support for Al Qaeda could indicate 
that she was trying to reestablish her honor and conform to the most conservative version 
of societal roles.  
It is clear that El-Aroud did not engage in violent extremism to fight for equality 
or a higher social status.  In fact, Cruickshank notes that during his interview with El-
Aroud, she was bossing her husband, Garsallaoui, around.127  She is also reported to have 
written, “Normally in Islam the men are stronger than the women, but I prove that it is 
important to fear God — and no one else. It is important that I am a woman. There are 
men who don’t want to speak out because they are afraid of getting into trouble. Even 
when I get into trouble, I speak out.”128 Furthermore, Belgian police have referred to her 
as an “Al Qaeda Living Legend.”129 
 
Jihad Jane or Colleen LaRose/Fatima LaRose – American Convert  
 Colleen LaRose, an American citizen and convert to Islam, was arrested in 2009 
for providing material support to a terrorist group and traveling to Europe to kill Lars 
Vilks, a Swedish cartoonist, for his portrayal of the prophet Mohammed’s head on a dog 
body.130  LaRose had a tumultuous life, which ultimately ended with her radicalization 
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and arrest on terrorism charges.  Prior to her conversion to Islam and radicalization, she 
was not involved in religion.131 
LaRose suffered from a very troubled and traumatic youth.  Throughout her 
childhood, LaRose’s father raped her.132  She also started using drugs in her youth.133 She 
eventually ran away from home and became a prostitute, before marrying a much older 
man at the age of sixteen.134 LaRose was divorced from her first husband and had married 
and divorced a second time before the age of twenty-four.135 At the time of her 
radicalization, she was living with her boyfriend outside of Philadelphia, PA and serving 
as his father’s caretaker.136   
 Colleen LaRose converted to Islam online and spent 2008-2009 communicating 
with extremists via chat rooms, which ultimately led to her radicalization to violent 
extremism.137 LaRose expressed that she became attached to the individuals she 
communicated with online and was easily convinced to act by these extremists.138  In 
addition to the plot against Vilks, she is accused of using the internet to recruit others and 
to raise money for violent extremism.139    
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LaRose communicated with an extremist in South Asia via the internet, and the 
two expressed their desire to become martyrs.140  She even agreed to marry the individual 
to assist him in getting into Europe, and he instructed her to kill Lars Vilks because Al 
Qaeda had ordered his assassination and was offering a reward.141 In August 2009, 
LaRose traveled to Europe to proceed with the plot.142  After six weeks of frustration and 
no action from her co-conspirators in Europe, LaRose returned to the US, where she was 
arrested.143   
 In 2014, LaRose was convicted for her role in the plot and sentenced to ten years 
of prison time.144  She apologized for her role in the plot and said she no longer wants 
jihad, but she maintains her adherence to Islam.145  LaRose explained that she was drawn 
to Islam because Islam provided “a sense of belonging after a troubled childhood.”146 
 LaRose experienced significant trauma in her youth, which continued into 
adulthood.  Based on these indicators, it appears that trauma played a role in motivating 
LaRose, but possibly in a different manner than others that experience trauma as a result 
of conflict.  Furthermore, she expressed that watching coverage of Israeli actions in Gaza 
gave her great stress and she became more radical with this, which indicates secondary 
traumatization.147 She states, “The Zionists started bombing the Palestinians and I 
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became more radical then. I started thinking more about Jihad.”148 In 2008, she is alleged 
to have posted a comment on YouTube expressing her desire to act to help victimized 
Muslims.149 Based on these comments and actions and her history, trauma and secondary 
traumatization were factors in her radicalization to violent extremism. Furthermore, her 
secondary traumatization led her to want revenge or to defend victimized Muslims.   
LaRose’s troubled past included events that would be considered violations of 
female honor and her conversion followed closely by her radicalization could indicate 
that she took her actions to the extreme to regain her honor and illustrate her commitment 
in an attempt to belong.  This is supported even further by the fact that she wished to 
pursue martyrdom.  LaRose experienced rape and multiple divorces, which are violations 
of female honor as defined in the theory.  Although she did not reside in a community 
with strict traditional roles like that of the Palestinian case studies typically cited for this 
motivation theory, societal norms still exist and the desire to belong and assume a strong 
identity.  
  
Discussion of Case Study Findings and the Resulting Policy Implications  
 
All four case studies experienced secondary trauma by associating with a 
victimized (actual or perceived) Muslim population, often from online materials or 
propaganda.  In three of the four case studies, the individual experienced personal trauma 
from either the loss of a relative or in the case of Colleen LaRose, trauma from rape.  
This suggests that trauma, as a motivation, should be considered beyond trauma caused 
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by conflict and violence and it suggests that trauma applies to a wide range of settings, 
including the West, which is generally considered stable and free of conflict.  Perhaps 
more importantly, the existence of secondary trauma in every case study illustrates the 
need for counter-radicalization and countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) 
materials and programs to refute propaganda, which depicts the West victimizing Muslim 
populations, or improved information campaigns when an incident, like that of the Abu 
Ghraib prison abuse and photographs, does occur.   This also indicates that violent 
extremist propaganda, specifically Al Qaeda propaganda, is effective on a Western 
audience.  
Similarly, revenge as a result of secondary traumatization was widespread 
throughout the case studies.  The women expressed a desire to avenge or help the 
victimized groups with which they had associated.  This does not exactly reflect the type 
of revenge found in the literature on revenge as a motivation, which is often revenge for 
the death of a close relative due to conflict with an enemy, but it demonstrates the impact 
and gravity of secondary traumatization.  
In the Degauque, El-Aroud, and LaRose case studies, the women had troubled 
pasts with incidents that could be deemed dishonorable or violating female purity and 
societal norms.  While a troubled past does not indicate a causal link to the motivation for 
regaining honor nor does it indicate a causal link to embracing violent extremism, it is 
noteworthy that three of the four case studies experienced violations of traditional female 
honor, as described by the literature, and then proceeded to adopt a rigid and extreme 
version of Islam. Also, it is interesting that this motivation could be a possibility in the 
West, which is often considered gender-neutral without rigid roles.  I did not expect to 
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find this as a possibility for Western case studies because the West is considered a more 
equal and liberal environment.  It is important for scholars and policymakers to take this 
into consideration when trying to understand radicalization and potential CVE efforts.   
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the trauma motivation and the regaining honor 
motivation seem to span both suicide and non-suicide actors.  This is particularly 
interesting given that both motivations previously were studied for suicide bombers. In 
the LaRose and Choudhry case studies, which did not end in a suicide attack, both 
individuals indicated that they were seeking or open to martyrdom, but neither individual 
pursued an attack where martyrdom was certain, as is the case with a suicide bombing. El 
Aroud did not express a desire for martyrdom and exhibited signs of both motivations.   
For all of the case studies analyzed, religion and politics played a role as a 
motivator in combination with other personal motivations. Political and religious factors 
primarily provided an identity for the individuals or a sense of belonging to a group, 
which was the group with which they associated with as part of secondary traumatization. 
For example, LaRose expressed that Islam gave her a sense of belonging and she also 
expressed that she had a desire to help victimized Muslims.150  These factors often 
seemed to be secondary motivations or motivations associated with the group to which 
the individual belonged.  
As expected, the motivation for female equality and breaking traditional roles was 
not illustrated in any of the Western case studies. This could be because women have a 
more equal role in Western countries or because it is a motivation built on weak 
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evidence/case studies.    Coercion was also not demonstrated in any of the analyzed case 
studies, but the importance of relationships with violent extremists was evident.  
 It was clear through the case study analysis that relationships with extremists 
play a large role in the radicalization process. Three of the four case studies developed 
relationships with extremists – Degauque and El-Aroud formed in-person relationships 
and LaRose developed a virtual relationship. Choudhry is the only one who did not have 
any communication with other extremists.   However, I chose not to include this as a 
motivation because I felt that these relationships reflected mobilization and socialization 
or interaction with other individuals more than a personal motivation that would prompt 
an individual to act.   
In any analysis of motivations, it is important to recognize the potential existence 
of group level propaganda and auto-propaganda in the accounts provided by female 
extremists.  A radicalized individual, particularly one who has socialized with other 
extremists, might state motivations that reflect the propaganda used by the group to 
attract members and justify the group’s cause, and it can be difficult to separate those 
from the individual’s motivations.151  Also, there is the potential for auto-propaganda in 
the accounts.  Auto-propaganda is propaganda used by the individual to “persuasively 
convince and remind themselves [the violent extremist] of the righteousness of their 
activities.” 152 This is important when looking at the motivations of female violent 
extremists because some of the material cited in their trials, interrogations and interviews 
could reflect adopted propaganda. Therefore, while these materials are studied for insight 
into what drives females to embrace violence extremism, any analysis must take into 
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account that the conveyed motivations might reflect the terrorist propaganda and 




 Understanding the motivations of women to engage in violent extremism is 
critical to understanding radicalization and therefore producing effective counter-
radicalization or countering violent extremist (CVE) and preventing violent extremism 
(PVE) policies. This study analyzed the motivations of Western female violent extremists, 
which is a group that has been understudied.  The analysis revealed that motivations 
traditionally associated with violent extremism in conflict zones and traditional Muslim 
communities with strict societal norms and roles can be applicable to Western case 
studies.   
It is important to acknowledge that there are limits on the conclusions and 
generalizations that can be made based on the small number of individual case studies 
used in this analysis and to the study of radicalization in general.  Radicalization is a 
highly individualized process and one that involves a relatively small number of people. 
These factors make definitive conclusions difficult.  Furthermore, causal links cannot be 
established with a small data set, particularly when there are uncontrolled variables.   
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 Throughout history, leaders have influenced and inspired individuals to act or to 
embrace a specific ideology. These leaders have espoused positive messages—Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi—and violent acts against civilian populations—
Adolf Hitler and Osama Bin Laden.  Inspirational leaders play a large role in 
radicalization to Islamic extremism and in the decision to use violence.  Today, in the age 
of constant and widespread information and communication, inspirational leaders are 
particularly important in the radicalization of homegrown extremists in the West, because 
their inspirational and propaganda materials are available globally.  Therefore, it is 
important to understand what traits and appeal inspirational leaders possess as a way to 
inform policy development and counter-radicalization strategy.  
 In this chapter, I examine the factors and characteristics one would expect to find 
in influential and inspirational Islamic extremist leaders even after they have died.  I 
specifically examine charisma, effective communication, and credibility and authority, 
which are three characteristics and skills leaders, including extremist leaders, often 
possess.  Based on a review of the literature, I expect to find that the inspirational leaders 
of Islamic extremist groups exhibit these characteristics regardless of when or where the 
leaders operate, including after they have died.  However, there is reason to believe that 
these characteristics would not be present for deceased leaders. This is significant 
because it will allow us to better understand the reach of these leaders after they have 
died.  Also, examining these characteristics will provide insight into how counter violent 
extremism (CVE) efforts can communicate effectively using some of the same tactics and 
characteristics of these leaders in the counter message.  Furthermore, understanding the 
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characteristics deceased leaders possess will help determine what policies are necessary 
to stop their influence after they have died.   
 This chapter is composed of six sections. It begins with a review of the literature 
on inspirational leaders and the factors that make them influential.  Second, it describes 
the structured, focused case study comparison methodology used to assess my argument 
using standard questions to extract the same information for comparison.  Third, I 
provide a detailed explanation for the case studies selected – Anwar al-Awlaki and 
Abdullah Azzam – and examine the cases using the structured, focused case study 
comparison methodology described in section two.  Fourth, I discuss the results and 
address similarities and differences between the two cases. I specifically address the fact 
that each of the leaders clearly exhibits charisma and establishes credibility, but effective 
communication is only partially demonstrated because unlike al-Awlaki, Abdullah 
Azzam does not include modern cultural references in his work.  Fifth, I outline the 
policy implications for Western governments given the results of the analysis, 
specifically related to targeted killings and preventing violent extremism policies.  Finally, 
the chapter concludes with my thoughts on inspirational leaders and the established 
characteristics, as well as questions for future research.   
 
Assessing the Field: Leadership  
 Most of the literature on Islamic extremism contends that inspirational leaders are 
crucial to the group, particularly for radicalization and recruitment.153  However, some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Jarrett Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2009), 52-78; Dipak 
Gupta, “Exploring roots of terrorism,” in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality, and ways forward, ed. 
Tore Bjorgo, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 19; Bruce Riedel and Christopher Boucek as quoted in 
Howard LaFranchi, “Anwar al-Awlaki Strike: Why It’s Important, But Not a Death-Blow for Al Qaeda,” 
Christian Science Monitor, September 30, 2011, accessed November 5, 2013. 
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scholars argue that inspirational leaders, while crucial to inspiring radicalization 
internationally, are not critical to the operation of the local group or affiliate.154  Both 
arguments recognize the role of inspirational leaders in radicalization, and that role is 
what makes these leaders important and dangerous, not necessarily their operational 
position within the local group.  These leaders are a threat because they inspire 
homegrown extremism and action, and they prompt individuals to travel to train with 
terrorist groups.155  These types of leaders are a major source of new recruits and 
radicalization to Islamic extremism.   
 Few academic scholars or national governments, particularly Western 
governments, dispute the importance of inspirational leaders. However, there are some 
scholars and governments that doubt the necessity of these types of leaders to the survival 
of movements.   For example, George Edwards in his study of charisma in U.S. 
presidential leadership proposes that leaders might be less important than generally 
thought with limited capabilities to sway the public.156  Yet, Edwards’ argument is based 
on an analysis of charisma looking at presidential approval ratings, and it is not 
applicable to inspirational terrorist leaders, whose primary role is radicalizing individuals 
and recruitment to embrace an ideology. The literature on presidential leadership is also 
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blow-for-Al-Qaeda; Mirra Noor Milla et al., “The impact of leader-follower interactions on the 
radicalization of terrorists: A case study of the Bali bombers,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 16 
(2013), accessed October 9, 2013, doi: 10.1111/ajsp.12007; Emmanuel Karagiannis, “European Converts to 
Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization,” Politics, Religion & Ideology, 13 (2012): 110, accessed September 
18, 2013, doi: 10.1080/21567689.2012.659495.  
154 Bruce Reidel quoted in LaFranchi, “Anwar al-Awlaki Strike: Why It’s Important, But Not a Death-Blow 
for Al Qaeda.” Riedel was speaking specifically about al-Awlaki but with a concept that can be generalized 
and is applicable to all inspirational leaders.   
155Jerome P. Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating A Complex Threat,” Congressional 
Research Service: Report (January 23, 2013): 19, 81. Faisal Shahzad being just one example.  He was 
influenced by Awlaki’s materials and sought training in Pakistan. 
156 George Edwards III, “Does the Messenger Matter? The Role of Charisma in Public Leadership,” 
Congress and the Presidency. 29:1 (2002), 44.  
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not completely comparable because presidents last for a brief period of time before 
another leader is elected, and they are focused on winning elections for office and for the 
party; whereas, inspirational leaders persist for a longer period of time even after death 
and are not concerned with elections. Interestingly, the Yemeni government has argued 
that Anwar al-Awlaki, a well-known Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
inspirational leader, was not as important as portrayed by the United States. 157   In fact, 
the Yemeni government argues that the United States media’s focus on al-Awlaki helped 
him as a recruiter and inspirational leader.158  However, the Yemeni government’s 
argument is not addressed within the scope of this analysis, which focuses on 
characteristics of inspirational leaders and not the media’s role in assisting these leaders.   
 After a review of the literature on leadership with a focus on leaders within 
Islamic extremism, I found that the literature on inspirational leaders focuses on three 
characteristics and skills: charisma, effective communication, and credibility or authority.   
 
Charisma 
 Throughout much of the literature, charisma is presented as a necessary 
characteristic of a leader, particularly for political leaders and terrorist leaders.159 Jessica 
Stern, analyzing the root causes of terrorism, describes charismatic leaders as “inflaming 
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November 8, 2010. Accessed November 13, 2013. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2010/1108/How-popular-will-Anwar-al-Awlaki-s-latest-video-be 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ted Robert Gurr,  “Economic Factors,” in Addressing The Causes of Terrorism. Club de Madrid Series 
on Democracy and Terrorism. Volume 1. March 2005; Jessica Stern, “Culture,” in Addressing The Causes 
of Terrorism. Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism. Volume 1. March 2005; Jerrold Post, 
“Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship,” Political Psychology, 7:4 (1986): 675-
688; Neil Smelser, The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 12; Edwards, “Does the Messenger Matter? The Role of Charisma in Public 
Leadership,” 25-26. 
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grievances and galvanizing support for a mission.”160 Bjorgo argues that charismatic 
leaders are also crucial because they communicate an ideology and channel the 
grievances of a group “into a political agenda for violent struggle,” which is key to the 
formation and survival of a terrorist group.161  Many scholars use “charismatic” as a 
descriptor of successful leaders without fully exploring what charismatic means in terms 
of action and communication or how charisma can be assessed.162   However, Jerrold 
Post’s study on the charismatic leader-follower relationship is an exception, which looks 
at behavior and interaction and provides a basis for assessing charisma that can be 
applied to inspirational terrorist leaders.163 
 Jerrold Post contends that the charismatic leader is a “mirror hungry personality” 
and the followers are the “ideal-hungry personality.”164  The mirror-hungry personality 
seeks “confirming and admiring responses to counteract their inner sense of 
worthlessness and lack of self-esteem,” and these individuals possess “feelings of 
grandiose omnipotence.” 165   The followers, or ideal-hungry personalities, seek to relate 
to a leader or individual “whom they can admire” and whom exhibits strength.166   In 
seeking someone they can relate to or look up to, the followers are essentially looking for 
a role model and an identity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Stern, “Culture,” 35.  
161 Ted Robert Gurr quoting Bjorgo in “Economic Factors,” 21; Smelser, The Faces of Terrorism: Social 
and Psychological Dimensions, 12.  
162 George Edwards touches on this point in his analysis of charisma as it applies to presidential leadership.  
163 Post, “Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship,” 675-688. 
164 Ibid 678-679.  Post explains that these two personality types stem from the development of the “injured 
self,” which occurs when an individual is psychologically damaged during early development. 
165 Ibid 679-680. 
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Post asserts that charismatic leaders use polarizing rhetoric or “polar absolutism,” 
which contributes to an “us vs. them” mentality.167 Additionally, Post explains that these 
charismatic leaders often portray themselves and their followers – the “us” – as “being on 
the side of God” and portray the enemy or the opposing group as on the side of Satan.168  
The followers are drawn to the absolutism and certainty of these leaders.169  These clearly 
defined boundaries and insider vs. outsider groups contribute to a sense of collective 
identity, which appeals to the ideal hungry personalities.   
Isolated individuals are one of the groups Post highlights as being attracted to 
these leader-follower relationships, particularly because the polarizing rhetoric provides 
them with a collective identity.170 The role of the followers as identity seekers is a 
common theme found throughout the literature exploring radicalization.   This theme 
directly relates to an analysis conducted by Colonel John M. Venhaus, which examines 
the reasons why youth elect to join Al Qaeda.171   Venhaus concluded that one of the 
main reasons that youth join Al Qaeda is for the sense of identity they gain from joining 
the group, including the acquired “structure, rules and perspective.”172 Oliver Roy asserts 
that the creation of or search for an identity is an important factor drawing individuals to 
terrorist groups.173 Additionally, Dipak Gupta asserts the importance of leaders in 
constructing the “us vs. them” message and corresponding collective identity.174     
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169 Ibid 681. 
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171Colonel John M. Venhaus, “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report. 
May 2010, 10, Accessed July 24, 2013. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf 
172 Ibid.  
173 Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004), 315.  
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 Based on an analysis of the literature, a charismatic leader can be defined as 
someone who exhibits strength and utilizes polarizing discourse to create a collective 
identity for ideal hungry followers, who are seeking an identity.  Charisma is based as 
much on the followers’ perception and acceptance of the leader as it is on the 
characteristics of the leader.175  Using these observations, I expect to find that the leaders 
in my case studies utilize polarizing language in their materials to project strength and a 
collective identity. This polarizing language will delineate clear boundaries for the 
seeking individual and will also include language that draws the individual into the “us” 
group.   
 
Effective Communication: Framing and Resonance  
 Effective communication is key to the success of an inspirational leader because 
his/her primary role is conveying information. The theory and concepts surrounding 
effective communication have been widely studied as scholars examine the radicalization 
process.  For the purposes of this analysis, effective communication encompasses the 
concepts of framing, resonance, and the ability to make material accessible to the 
audience.  
 Several scholars, and even fellow extremists emphasize a leader’s ability to 
translate complex concepts into more accessible information and ideas.176  Samir Khan, a 
radicalized American and editor of Al Qaeda’s English language magazine, Inspire, was 
quoted as saying that Bin Laden and Zawahiri were “geniuses for having the ability to 
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mold their ideology into simple yet influential messages that can reach the grass-roots 
level.”177  Locicero and Sinclair found that simplicity is appealing to some followers of 
extremist ideologies.178   Similarly, Jarrett Brachman writes about Safar al-Hawali, a 
Saudi cleric arrested for religious activism, “what made Hawali so accessible and popular, 
however, was that he was able to take these often esoteric, complex and abstract religious 
ideas and apply them to the political and social realities of everyday life.”179  This 
statement not only reflects the importance of turning complex ideas into simple messages, 
but also touches on the next two components of effective communication: framing and 
resonance.   
 The concepts of frames and framing were portrayed in the literature as an 
important tool or skill for inspirational leaders to master for effective communication and 
connection with individuals.180  Both Wiktorowicz and Della Porta and Diani define 
frames as interpretative schemata that inform or determine how an individual perceives 
and understands information and events.181 As Wiktorowicz states, frames are 
“interpretative schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of 
experiences and events,” and framing is the “process of meaning construction.”182 Frames 
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are particularly important to leaders who are trying to mobilize individuals to collective 
action through frame alignment and communication of aligned grievances and strains.183 
The ideology presented by the leaders must be articulated and presented in a framework 
that is understood by the potential audience. The presentation is key to the audience’s 
interpretation of information or an ideology.   
Frames must resonate with individuals to accomplish understanding and 
radicalization and ultimately collective action.184  Resonance describes the audience’s 
ability to relate to the material and the manner in which it is presented.  Resonance is 
highly dependent on the incorporation of cultural references, understandable or 
familiar/local language, and identities or collective memories in frames.185  Della Porta 
and Diani stress the importance of tying the ideology to the culture or environment.186  
They also write, frames “should resonate not only with their targets, but with the broader 
cultural structure in which a movement develops.”187 Resonance is closely related to the 
credibility of the messenger or leader, as I discuss in the next section.   
Based on an analysis of the literature, I expect to find that the leaders under review 
will utilize cultural references and language tailored to their intended audience.  I also 
expect the leader will use accessible language that clearly conveys information without 
becoming immersed in scholarly debate that would require a greater understanding or 
religious background.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Wiktorowicz, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research,” 202, 
205; Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 82.  
184 Wiktorowicz, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research,” 202. 
185 Ibid 205.  
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Credibility and Authority 
As discussed in the final chapter on credible counter-radicalization programs, 
credibility is crucial to any message or ideology.  This same characteristic is applicable 
and crucial to inspirational terrorist leaders.188  As Kouzes and Posner assert, “Credibility 
is the foundation of leadership.”189  Generally, individuals want to follow leaders that 
they can trust and that have the knowledge or expertise to lead.190  When applying this to 
inspirational leaders in Islamic extremism, this means that the leader has religious 
authority and knowledge to guide others, while also seeming logical and maintaining 
strong character.191  Islam is generally decentralized and does not have a hierarchical 
structure; therefore, establishing credibility and authority is key and also more 
complicated because no overarching authority provides guidance.192   
The literature highlights the importance of credibility for framing and 
resonance.193  Wiktorowicz and Della Porta and Diani stress the need for well-formed 
messages projected by reputable and established leaders.194  As Wiktorowicz asserts, 
“resonance depends upon…the reputation of the individual or group responsible for 
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articulating the frame.”195  Without credibility the information conveyed will not resonate 
with an individual or group of individuals, no matter how charismatic the leader or well 
articulated the message.   
Recognizing the importance of credibility and authority in Islamic extremism, 
particularly within Al Qaeda, Wiktorowicz performed a detailed analysis that examines 
the four framing methods that leaders employ to assert credibility.196  The four methods 
for asserting credibility and authority are:  
• vilification of rivals (name-calling, character attacks),  
• exaltation of members within the group (emphasize positive and authority),  
• credentialing of leaders within the group (emphasize expertise), and  
• de-credentialing of rivals (attack experience and expertise).197   
These four methods can be grouped into crediting to boost authority and credibility 
(exaltation and credentialing of members/leaders) and discrediting to harm the reputation 
of a rival and detract from the rival’s authority (vilification and de-credentialing of rivals 
or enemies).198   
Wiktorowicz’s analysis is specific to intra-movement authority posturing between 
Al-Qaeda’s leaders and rival Islamic fundamentalist, who are opposed to indiscriminate 
violent action; however, the overarching concepts of framing methods to assert credibility 
can be applied beyond rival Islamic leaders.199  In either application, the audience 
typically does not have the background to accurately assess and understand the religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Wiktorowicz, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research,” 203. 
196 Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s Struggle for Sacred 
Authority,” 159. 
197 Ibid 159, 165-167. 
198 Ibid 164. 
199 Ibid 159. 
	   63 
arguments and justifications put forth by the leaders, so they default to the reputation of 
the leader.200 As Wiktorowicz asserts, “The credibility of the messenger is a necessary 
prerequisite for frame alignment.”201  Therefore, framing to establish authority and 
credibility is key to inspirational leadership and greatly impacts frame alignment and 
resonance – effective communication – with the audience.202  Based on this information 
on credibility, I expect the leaders will utilize one of the methods or a combination of the 
methods described by Wiktorowicz to establish credibility and authority.   
 
 
Methodology: Structured, Focused Case Study Comparison 
 For this analysis, I utilize a case study methodology that is slightly different than 
the methodology used in Chapter 1.  I employ a structured, focused case study 
comparison as described by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett in Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Social Sciences.203  A structured, focused case study 
comparison utilizes a set of standardized questions to collect the same data for each case 
study, so that the scholar can easily compare the cases and establish findings.204  The 
questions must revolve around the proposed theory and lead to the collection of 
information that is useful for analyzing the proposed question and comparing similar 
information.205  Unlike individual case study techniques, this approach allows for a 
“systematic comparison” across the case studies of interest.206 
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Much of the literature on leadership chooses to examine one particular aspect or 
characteristic of leaders (e.g. charisma) rather than a comprehensive set of expectations 
and characteristics.  Similarly, the literature on Islamic extremist leaders typically focuses 
on one leader and studies that particular leader in great detail.  My investigation utilizes a 
unique methodology that allows for the direct comparison of leaders and tests the basis of 
a set of comprehensive characteristics.  I utilize the following questions as a basis for 
examining and comparing the case studies:  
1. Leadership Importance – Have terrorist plots or attacks been linked to the 
leader?  How were the perpetrators exposed to the leader’s materials (YouTube, 
writings, personal contact)?  
2. Charisma - Does the leader exhibit polarizing language to create an “us vs. them” 
environment for a collective identity? Did the leader create a collective identity 
and set of boundaries that would be appealing to an identity seeker? 
3. Framing – Does the leader incorporate cultural references aimed at a particular 
audience?  Is the material accessible or tailored for a less academic or scholarly 
oriented audience?  
4. Credibility/Authority – What is the leader’s academic and religious 
background?  How does each leader establish religious authority – resume, 
rhetoric?   
 
 
Terrorist Leader Case Studies 
The two case studies selected for analysis are Anwar al-Awlaki and Abdullah 
Azzam.  Both are deceased, famous leaders within Islamic extremism who have been 
widely cited and connected to terrorist plots within the last fifteen years.  For this analysis, 
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I define a connection to terrorist plots in two ways: a terrorist actor has referenced the 
leader as inspiration or guidance in his/her radicalization to violent extremism and 
willingness to act, or authorities have determined a terrorist actor has studied the leaders 
materials and/or had a form of communication. These case studies focus on plots around 
and after September 11, 2001.  The post-mortem connection provides an interesting 
control variable because neither leader is active and producing materials.  I have selected 
Anwar al-Awlaki because he has had a substantial impact on Western homegrown 
terrorism, particularly through his online inspirational materials.  For my second case 
study, I have selected Sheikh Abdullah Azzam because his materials have been 
connected to Western radicalization and plots that extend beyond his death in 1989.  
Additionally, al-Awlaki followed Azzam, which adds an additional connection between 
the two leaders. 207  
 
Anwar al-Awlaki  
 
 Anwar al-Awlaki was an Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader, 
famously known as the “Bin Laden of the Internet.”208  He was born in New Mexico in 
the U.S. and lived in the U.S. for twenty-one years of his life.209  When Awlaki was seven 
years old his father moved the family back to Yemen because of his position as 
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agriculture minister within the Yemeni government.210  In Yemen, he studied Islam as 
part of his education in his teenage years.211  He then returned to the U.S. to pursue a 
degree in engineering and a Master’s degree in education.212  While in the U.S., Awlaki 
married and turned from his degrees to work as an imam at several mosques across the 
country from Denver to California to Virginia.213  
Reports also conflict and give some indication that Awlaki might have had radical 
leanings during his time in the U.S.214 Awlaki was investigated on two separate occasions 
by the FBI: first in 1999 for his ties to an alleged “procurement agent for Osama bin 
Laden” and again in 2000 for his connections to Omar Abdel Rahman, a “leading plotter” 
in the 1993 World Trader Center bombing.215 Neither investigation produced results to 
implicate Awlaki.216  There are conflicting views on whether or not Awlaki was a 
member of Al Qaeda at the time of September 11, 2001 and played a role in the attacks 
because he had contact with two of the 9/11 hijackers and was vice president of an 
organization later deemed a front for Al Qaeda.217 The FBI never obtained enough 
evidence to tie him to terrorist activity.218  
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In 2002, Awlaki moved to the UK, where he was affiliated with Muslim-
Brotherhood organizations.219  During this time, he signaled his radicalization with his 
speeches to the youth about the threat of the West.220 After struggling financially in the 
UK, he finally returned to Yemen in 2004, where he became a lecturer at a Sunni 
school.221  In 2006-2007, Awlaki was imprisoned for an Al Qaeda kidnapping plot 
against a U.S. official.222  The imprisonment was reportedly done at the urging of the U.S. 
government, and when he was released, he openly supported violence in his publications 
(e.g. 44 Ways to Support Jihad), videos and a multitude of online materials, including his 
newly established blog.223  After this point, Awlaki became increasingly connected to 
terrorist attacks and plots throughout the West; he was eventually deemed part of Al 
Qaeda operations and put on a U.S. list of designated terrorists approved for targeted 
killings.224  On September 30, 2011, Awlaki was killed in a U.S. drone strike.225   
Awlaki was widely known throughout the West because of his U.S. citizenship 
and his ties to many plots and attacks in the West, particularly homegrown attacks in the 
U.S. and U.K.    These attacks and plots include: the Times Square attempted bombing, 
the July 7, 2005 bombing in the London Underground, Roshonara Choudhry, the 
Christmas Day bomber, the Fort Hood shooting, and the Boston bombers.226  Most of 
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these connected extremists found Awlaki’s materials on the internet via his blog, 
YouTube videos and even through personal email communication.227 Additionally, 
Awlaki played a key role in creating the AQAP English language magazine, Inspire, 
which is another way his followers connected to his materials.228  
Awlaki’s materials persist on the internet today even though his blog has been 
removed and some moderate websites have removed his materials.229 Awlaki’s materials 
spanned a variety of topics, so not all materials were focused on violence.  Also, because 
he started out with moderate preaching, many individuals were familiar with his 
moderate pieces and questioned whether to keep his early materials after he transitioned 
to preaching prescriptions for violence and was designated a terrorist.230   This is 
important because some individuals who followed him as a moderate might have not 
realized the gradual progression or the gradual progression might have made the 
transition to violent radicalization easier.  A fellow imam from his former Virginia 
mosque said he advised individuals and shops to get rid of even the moderate materials 
because “It becomes a gateway for the unsuspecting.” 231  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Suspected Ties to Terror Plots,” The New York Times, September 30, 2011. Accessed November 13, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/30/world/middleeast/the-killing-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html; 
Faisal Shahzad is the Times Square Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab is the Christmas Day Bomber, 
Major Nidal Hasan was the Fort Hood Shooter and Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnev were the Boston 
bombers. The Boston bombing occurred after Awlaki’s death, but given his relatively recent death, it will 
be important to monitor plots linked to his materials. 
227Jarrett Brachman and Alix Levine, “You Too Can Be Awlaki!” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 
2011. Vol. 35, 26. Accessed October 7, 2013. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Fletcher-
Forum/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/Fletcher%20Forum/PDFs/2011winter/Brachman-Levine.pdf; 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad. 
228 Meleagrou-Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western 
Jihad, 74. 
229Margaret Coker, “ Cleric Cited by Tsarnaev Lives On-Online,” The Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2013. 
Accessed November 13, 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323687604578465023366949366 
230 Shane and Mekhennet, “Imam’s Path from Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad”; Meleagrou-
Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad, 6. 
231 Shane and Mekhennet, “Imam’s Path from Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad.” 
	   69 
 
Abdullah Azzam  
Sheikh Abdullah Azzam is often referred to as the “ideological father of Al 
Qaeda,” the “father of the modern global jihad,” or the “godfather of jihad.”232  Azzam 
was an Islamic scholar and inspirational leader, who was born in the Palestinian West 
Bank and was greatly impacted by events with Israel, including the 1948 creation of 
Israel and the 1967 Six-Day War.233  He joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 
spent time in Cairo again at the height of militant activism (1971-1973), which increased 
his network and connected him to some of the most famous Islamists, including the 
family of Sayyid Qutb.234  Despite his family’s protests, Azzam participated in 
“Palestinian Jihad” or guerilla warfare against Israel from 1967-1970, which gave him 
battlefield experience and credibility.235 
Azzam was highly educated in Islam and Islamic law.  He attended an Islamic law 
school in Damascus (1963-1966), received his Master’s in Islamic law from the 
prestigious Al-Azhar University (1968-1969), and earned his doctorate from Al-Azhar 
(1971-1973).236  He also taught at many different schools and universities over the years 
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in Jordan, in Saudi Arabia at the King Abdul Ibn Saud in 1980, and finally in Islamabad 
in 1981.237  Azzam moved to Islamabad to join and assist the Afghan jihad after being 
motivated by Sheikh Kamal al-Sananiri.238 While stationed in Pakistan, Azzam traveled 
to Afghanistan in the early 1980s and spent time trying to recruit Arab volunteers to the 
fight.239   
Azzam is credited for creating the ideology and structural framework for the 
global jihad building off of and moving beyond the disparate national struggles.240  He 
led the drive for jihad to defend Muslims against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.241  
Azzam and Osama Bin Laden established the Service Bureau in Islamabad to facilitate 
international recruitment and training camps for Muslims trying to fight in 
Afghanistan.242  Reports indicate that as many as 10,000 individuals were recruited.243 
Azzam traveled internationally and even established branches of the Service Bureau in 
the U.S. as part of his recruitment drive to bring Muslims to Afghanistan.244  During this 
time he wrote Defense of Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan, which are two of his most 
famous works still in circulation today that describe a global “Islamist military defense 
effort” and justify jihad as a individual obligation.245  These two famous works and other 
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recorded lectures and ideological pieces were widely circulated prior to Azzam’s death 
and continue to be circulated today.246   
In 1989, Azzam was assassinated in Pakistan, one year after Bin Laden formed Al 
Qaeda.247  Reports have speculated that Bin Laden was responsible for his death because 
of their split in 1988 and divergent views on jihad.248  Azzam’s goal was to expel foreign 
occupiers and defend Muslim lands, focusing on Afghanistan.249  However, Bin Laden 
and Zawahiri formed Al Qaeda and took a different turn targeting “false” and “corrupt” 
Muslim regimes as well as pursuing non-military targets and targets in non-Muslim 
countries.250  Azzam did not call for attacks on “the territory of the faraway enemy” nor a 
“global insurrection,” and his strategy was more aligned with guerilla warfare.251 
Today, Azzam continues to be tied to plots as inspiration and there are even 
designated terrorist groups named after him.252  He has been connected to recent plots 
and attacks, including: the 9/11 attackers, Faisal Shahzad, Roshonara Choudhry, and the 
2009 suicide attack by a Jordanian agent on a CIA base.253  Roshonara Choudhry stated 
he was a source of guidance and inspiration in her trial, which is particularly interesting 
given that she attacked twenty years after Azzam’s death.254   Terrorist groups around the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Ibid 95. 
247 Gunaratna,“After Osama bin Laden Will Al Qaeda Survive?” 126; Riedel, “The 9/11 Attacks’ Spiritual 
Father.” 
248 Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior, 7; 
Hegghammer, “Abdallah Azzam, The Imam of Jihad,” 96-98. 
249 Gunaratna,“After Osama bin Laden Will Al Qaeda Survive?” 126; Post, Leaders and Their Followers in 
a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior, 7; Hegghammer, “Abdallah Azzam, The Imam 
of Jihad,” 99. Azzam focused on the external enemy and developed a “territorial form of Islamism.” 
250 Gunaratna,“After Osama bin Laden Will Al Qaeda Survive?” 126; Hegghammer, “Abdallah Azzam, 
The Imam of Jihad,” 96-97. 
251 Hegghammer, “Abdallah Azzam, The Imam of Jihad,” 101.  
252 “Terrorist Organization Profile: Battalion of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam,” National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism And Responses to Terrorism – University of Maryland, Accessed October 16, 2013, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4561 
253 Riedel, “The 9/11 Attacks’ Spiritual Father.” 
254 Dodd, “Roshonara Choudhry: Police interview extracts.”  
	   72 
world quote his work as inspiration and dedicate attacks to him.255   According to news 
reports, videos of Azzam can still be accessed on extremist websites like 
“revolutionmuslim.”256 This website has been taken down since the 2009 Choudhry 
attack on Member of Parliament Stephen Timms, but it is one example of how Azzam’s 
materials have continually resurfaced and been cited as inspiration or guidance even in an 
attack twenty years after his death. 
   
Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
Charisma:  
 Awlaki and Azzam are both often described as charismatic leaders without a 
greater description or analysis of what charisma means. An analysis illustrates that each 
leader’s language and narrative contributes to his magnetism.   
 Awlaki’s case conforms to the scholarly literature on charismatic leadership, 
particularly his ties to plots performed by identity-seekers and his language creating clear 
boundaries and a sense of certainty for identity-seekers. Awlaki depicts a world where the 
media and governments are all at war with Islam.  For example, “ On the political 
level…every single government in the world is in line to fight Islam.”257  He leaves no 
room for uncertainty or for alternative arguments. This definitive language and boundary 
setting is evident in Constants on the Path to Jihad when he discusses the question he 
receives from the youth on which Islamic group to join, “The issue shouldn’t be 
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confusing at all, because this is the religion of Allah, and Allah has made it clear.”258 
Awlaki is providing unambiguous and confident answers to the questions of young 
Western Muslims.  This is critical to his appeal to young Western Muslims who are 
confused and trying to gain a better understanding of their religion as well as develop an 
identity.  
Additionally, a review of Awlaki’s materials and videos demonstrates he clearly 
uses polarizing language to establish a collective identity.  As he writes in “‘The Life and 
Times of Umar bin Khattab,’ Brothers and sisters…Umar told Ayaash, don’t believe 
them, they want to deceive you.  The important lesson to learn here is never, ever trust 
the kuffar. Do not trust them.”259 This excerpt illustrates Awlaki clearly defining an “us” 
vs. “them” mentality and delineating boundaries between the kuffar or unbelievers and 
Muslims.  Awlaki also ensures that his message is inclusive, “I have socialized with some 
Islamic groups but did not find them taking interest in brotherhood the way I’ve found in 
Al Qaeda.”260  This collective identity provides the structure and sense of belonging 
desired by the identity seekers.   
 Sheikh Abdullah Azzam’s case also adheres to the scholarly perspectives 
regarding charisma.  Azzam clearly creates an us vs. them mentality and a collective 
identity united to confront the enemy oppressor and “protecting those who are 
oppressed.”261  Azzam creates two defined groups: Muslims and the unbelievers.262  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Awlaki, “Constants on the Path to Jihad,” as quoted in Meleagrou-Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie: 
How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad, 62.  
259 Meleagrou-Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western 
Jihad, 48. 
260 Anwar al-Awlaki, “Why Did I Choose Al Qaeda?” Inspire Magazine, Fall 2011, Issue 8, 53. Accessed 
November 13, 2013. http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/inspire-magazine-8.pdf 
261 Abdullah Azzam, “Join the Caravan,” in The Canons of Jihad Terrorists’ Strategy for  
Defeating America, edited by Jim Lacey, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 124-125.  
262 Abdullah Azzam, “The Defense of Muslim Territories” in Al Qaeda In Its Own Words,  
	   74 
Additionally, he portrays the invaders of Afghanistan and Palestine as the enemy and 
those individuals who defend those lands from the invaders as a collective group that is 
not sinning.263 
 Azzam creates a collective identity of Muslims and then appeals to the audience 
to join the group and fulfill a duty to protect a victimized population.264  In Join the 
Caravan, Azzam goes so far as to explain that “Jihad is a collective act of worship and 
every group must have a leader.”265 Also, Azzam’s materials state that jihad is an 
individual obligation and they allude to the idea that an individual who participates in 
jihad can be a source of strength or a hero to those oppressed Muslims.266  This would be 
an alluring concept for an identity seeker trying to establish a position or role within a 
group. The idea of jihad as an obligation would also give an identity seeker a clear sense 
of purpose and define their position within Islam and the political arena. 
 Azzam and Awlaki appeal to identity seekers today because of their community- 
oriented messages and collective identity.  Also, both leaders use inclusive language 
incorporating collective pronouns like “us”, “we”, and “our” to create the shared identity 
and group.267  This paired with each leader’s polarizing rhetoric is evidence that both 
leaders adhere to the scholarly perspectives on charisma beyond the general descriptor of 
charismatic. 
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Effective Communication:  
Awlaki’s case follows the literature on effective communication.  Awlaki was a 
native English speaker, which meant he was able to effectively communicate with his 
audience in the West and even had an American accent as is evident in watching his 
YouTube videos. As Jarrett Brachman states, he appealed to a Western audience because 
of “his ability to combine religious doctrine with colloquial Western references.”268   
Awlaki’s use of colloquialisms and Western English references is evident throughout his 
materials. For example, Awlaki wrote, “Jihad is becoming as American as apple pie and 
as British as afternoon tea.”269  He also utilized current events and political references 
that would be familiar to his audience and, where possible, would tie directly to historical 
events from Islam.  In “Constants on the Path to Jihad,” he writes as though he is directly 
addressing Donald Rumsfield’s memo on the growth of the global jihad, “Well, Mr. 
Rumsfeld, the reason is because you are fighting al-Taifatul Mansura, which Allah 
promised that he will protect.”270  Perhaps more importantly, Awlaki was able to tie the 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars directly to the battles of the Prophet Muhammed.271 These 
Western cultural and current event references assist in frame alignment and make 
resonance more likely because the readers are able to relate to the material. 
In constructing his message, Awlaki simplified complex religious doctrine and 
“repackaged al-Qaeda’s convoluted and inaccessible message” into more understandable 
material.272  Awlaki’s Western target audience did not (and still does not) have a deep 
understanding of Islam, so he was effective in speaking to them because his message was 
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not overly academic or theoretical; whereas, he might not have been as effective in 
speaking to an audience with a deep and scholarly understanding of Islam.273  His skill in 
making complex religious material accessible to the average audience adheres to the 
literature on influential leaders, and contrasts sharply with the highly academic writing of 
Azzam.  
After reviewing Azzam’s materials, it is clear that his writing does not entirely 
follow the scholarly literature for effective communication for the modern or Western 
audience because he does not utilize Western cultural references or colloquialisms and 
accessible language.  However, the materials would have appealed to the audience and 
grievances at the time of his writing because it invokes references to Communism, the 
Red Army and the Soviet invasion.274  In his piece, “To the Young Muslims of the United 
States,” Azzam does appeal to the grievances of a confused young Muslim trying to 
balance religion with a more liberal cultural. For example, “God gave these centers 
[Muslim Arab Youth Association centers] the noble task of saving young people who run 
the risk of drowning in the stinking swamp of promiscuity.”275  Yet, even in this example, 
it is clear he does not use cultural references and colloquial language.  
Azzam’s language is much more academic and scholarly than that of Awlaki, and 
his writings invoke many Quran references without cultural framing or explanation to aid 
in understanding for those less educated in Islam.276 It is not as accessible as the language 
and stories of Awlaki.  Also, Azzam’s materials had to be translated from Arabic, which 
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adds an additional layer of language complexity and means the materials do not have the 
same level of accessible English.277  
A modern audience could have interpreted Azzam’s references to Afghanistan as 
applicable to the grievances associated with the U.S. conflict and invasion.   However, it 
is interesting that Azzam does not conform to the scholarly literature on simplifying and 
using accessible language with cultural references, yet he is still impacting modern 
Muslims and even individuals in the West.  It is likely that his materials regarding 
Afghanistan and Palestine resonate with Muslims today because of the issues and 
conflicts in those regions.  Since Azzam’s materials do not fully conform to the scholarly 
literature on effective communication as examined in the literature review and yet he still 
finds an audience with modern Muslims, it leads to the question of whether his materials 
are being repackaged from their original production to accommodate different audiences 
or if the other two factors - charisma and credibility – play a larger role in his influence.   
 
Credibility:  
Awlaki’s followers considered him a credible, religious authority even though he 
did not have battlefield experience or higher education in Islamic studies.278  His email 
communication with Nidal Hasan is one example of the trust in his religious authority.  
Hasan emailed with Awlaki discussing the religious justification and authority for killing 
because “previous fatwas [were] vague and not definitive.”279  It is also important to note 
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that even the U.S. government found that he was credible as is evident by his invitations 
to speak at the Pentagon in February 2002.280   
Awlaki conforms to the literature on establishing credibility, particularly 
Wiktorowicz’s explanation of discrediting adversaries to establish credibility.281  Unlike 
Azzam, Awlaki lacked the expertise and advanced degrees in Islamic studies to establish 
credibility based on scholarly credentialing. Instead, he portrays himself in the same 
manner as past clerics and uses discrediting techniques, specifically vilification, against 
those who try to dispute his messages.282 For example, he repeatedly calls non-Muslims, 
“kuffar,” which is a derogatory term meaning infidel.283  In “Constants on the Path to 
Jihad,” Awlaki depicts a negative image of the different parties that are “at war with 
Islam”, including Christianity and Judaism as well as various state governments.284  
These are just a few examples of vilification that Awlaki invokes to establish his 
credibility and to degrade the opposing side’s reputation and credibility.  
Also, Awlaki established credibility from his experiences, particularly his 
experiences living in the U.S. as a Muslim and the challenges associated with living in 
the West.285  For example, he was quoted on a website as saying, “I eventually came to 
the conclusion that jihad against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on 
every other able Muslim.”286 His use of personal experience living in the West to 
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illustrate his credibility could also be interpreted as a form of credentialing as defined by 
Wiktorowicz.287  
 As illustrated in the case study, Azzam was a highly trained religious scholar with 
many degrees and an advanced degree from one of the most reputable religious schools.  
He also spent many years teaching at widely known and reputable universities.288  His 
credibility and authority were built upon his academic expertise and credentials.   His 
case fits within Wiktorowicz’ academic theory that credibility can be built upon 
credentialing.289  Also, Azzam’s life experiences on the battlefield and growing up in 
Palestine during times of war contributed to his credentials.  
 Azzam derives much of his legitimacy from his academic and battlefield 
qualifications, but he also injected discrediting language into his written work.  For 
example, he calls into question the reputation of those who might disagree with him on 
the topic of jihad as an individual obligation.  He writes in Join the Caravan, “Whoever 
advises an able Muslim not to go for jihad is just like the one who advises him to eat in 
Ramadan while he is healthy…”290 By attacking or de-credentialing potential opposing 
voices, Azzam enhances his credibility and authority on the subject of jihad.291  
 Even though Azzam and Awlaki have very different backgrounds, they each 
utilize a combination of credentialing and discrediting to support their authority in the 
subject matter. This confirms the literature on techniques to establish credibility and also 
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emphasizes the importance of establishing credibility for the message to be accepted and 
legitimate.   
 
Policy Implications  
The case study analysis of Abdullah Azzam and Anwar al-Awlaki determined in what 
ways leaders are essential to the survival of a movement and the characteristics that make 
them essential and influential.  The findings indicate that the leaders’ ability to 
communicate and resonate with individuals using polarizing language to create a 
collective identity and cultural references, as well as their ability to establish credibility 
on Islam are critical elements to the message, which should be incorporated into CVE 
and PVE communication efforts.  Also, the case study analysis illustrates that these 
leaders exhibit many of these characteristics and are influential even after death; this 
finding indicates that targeted killings of inspirational leaders will not be entirely 
effective for neutralizing their impact if a CVE effort is not implemented to counter their 
message.   
Targeted Killing of Terrorist Leaders 
Inspirational leaders are difficult for policymakers to combat, particularly with the 
advent and growth of the internet and global communication technologies. The internet 
and global communication technologies carry the leader’s messages internationally and 
the materials live on and duplicate.  As Jarrett Brachman states, “The challenge for 
governments is not simply how to mute these hateful voices in the short term but how to 
deal with their legacies over the long term.”292  It is important to figure out how to 
combat these extremist inspirational leaders when they are alive and producing new 
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material and communicating with potential recruits, but it is even more important to 
develop effective policy and strategies to decrease the appeal and effectiveness of the 
leader’s message in the long-term, meaning after the leader has died.  
A review of the case studies and the literature in the field provides contradicting 
views on the success of removing or killing leaders to degrade the terrorist network.  
Post’s description of a charismatic leader-follower relationship implies that removing the 
leader could potentially have long term impacts on the leader’s influence and reach on 
future audiences because the bond between leader and follower would no longer exist.293  
However, as the Azzam and Awlaki case studies indicate, the death of an inspirational 
leader does not mean the leader will stop influencing and inspiring individuals to 
radicalize.  The leaders’ materials endure, particularly with the internet and the current 
communication and information environment.  As noted in the case study analysis, 
Azzam has been listed as inspiration in several terrorist radicalization cases, including to 
Roshonara Choudhry and the September 11, 2001 hijackers, even though these events 
took place many years after his death.294 Similarly, Awlaki has been connected to the 
April 2013, Boston Bombing, which occurred two years after his death.295 
Also, a deceased leader’s materials are often reproduced and translated or even 
distorted and taken out of context to support a group’s goals. As many scholars have 
indicated and as a review of Azzam’s materials illustrates, Azzam would most likely not 
have approved of the current Al Qaeda ideology, which permits the killing of civilians 
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and violence outside of the battlefield to target the “faraway enemy.”296  The Azzam case 
study demonstrates that the integrity of the leader’s material or the true meaning can be 
manipulated to serve a different cause or purpose. Based on this information and the 
evidence that a leader’s materials endure long after the leader has died, Western 
governments should explore counter-messaging or refuting propaganda and inaccurate 
interpretations by exposing the leader’s true meaning and inserting doubt into the 
material’s validity.  
 
Countering or Preventing Violent Extremism (CVE, PVE) Programs  
 Western governments should take into account the characteristics that have made 
inspirational leaders effective when constructing counter-radicalization and counter-
messaging efforts tailored to combat the threat posed by inspirational leaders.  As the 
previous chapter on counter-radicalization programs established, credibility is crucial to 
an effective message.  Messengers for counter-radicalization efforts should have the 
credentials to refute the terrorist message.  These programs should use the same 
discrediting tactics terrorist leaders use to damage the credibility and authority of the 
authors and messengers of extremist materials.  Also, counter-radicalization efforts 
should incorporate cultural references and construct frames that are accessible to the 
population both in content and language.  
 Charisma is the characteristic of inspirational leaders that is more difficult for 
Western counter-radicalization efforts to reproduce.  Since charisma has been related to 
identity seekers, it is important to provide alternative groups for these individuals to join.  
As Venhaus proposes, government organizations and non-profit groups can create 
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community service groups, sport teams and other activity related groups that provide 
structure and meaning for an identity seeker.297 Furthermore, the counter-message 
provided through PVE programs could establish polarizing rhetoric that portrays the 
violent terrorist groups as the “them,” killing innocent civilians and violating the Quran.   
All of these characteristics of leaders should be considered for incorporation into new and 
existing PVE programs.  
 
Conclusion 
 The analysis illustrates that leaders exhibit three characteristics to some degree: 
charisma, effective communication and credibility/ authority.  These three characteristics 
are crucial to the level of influence and connection each leader has with the population.  
With this knowledge, Western governments can incorporate the identified characteristics 
of influential terrorist leaders in the development and refinement of strategies and 
counter-radicalization programs to achieve a greater level of success.   Western 
governments can also exploit the weaknesses in these characteristics after the leader has 
died to render the materials less effective.   
However, this research also raises questions for future research. Are the legacies 
of deceased leaders really a threat or is the bigger issue that new leaders and individuals 
are re-packaging the materials of deceased leaders to meet their agenda and to spur the 
population? This is a very important question that could greatly impact counter-
radicalization policies as well as policies on targeted killing of combatants.  This is a 
question that will be best examined when more time has passed from Awlaki’s death. 
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CHAPTER 3 - 
BLAME THE MESSENGER: AN EXAMINATION OF COUNTER-
RADICALIZATION PROGRAMS AND THE IMPACT OF A GOVERNMENT 
CONNECTION 
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 As the United States’ military destroyed Al-Qaeda leadership and drove the 
network to decentralize for survival after September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda turned to 
propaganda and radicalization tactics, particularly online, to recruit and instruct people to 
act internationally.  In response, many countries established counter-radicalization 
programs to provide a counter-narrative to Al-Qaeda’s propaganda and recruitment 
materials.  Counter-radicalization programs have taken many forms and structures, 
targeting both domestic and international audiences. These programs utilize a variety of 
platforms, ranging from physical interaction to virtual conversations and publications.   
Some programs are run by think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
technology sector initiatives (i.e. Google Ideas), while others are government controlled 
or government initiated but administered by the local community (i.e. Viral Peace). 
Opposing views have emerged on the impact a close government connection has on a 
program’s relationship with the intended audience or other individuals vulnerable to 
radicalization.   
 This paper argues that a close and evident government connection, negatively 
impacts the counter-radicalization program’s relationship with the intended audience.  
Furthermore, this paper contends that the type of government involved influences how 
the government connection to the program is perceived.  If the program is hosted in a 
Western, secular democracy, the connection to government will negatively impact how 
the audience views the program’s message and potentially how they view the messengers.  
However, if the program is hosted in a country more closely tied to Islam or governed by 
Islamic law, the program will not suffer the same legitimacy and credibility issues 
because the government has more authority in Islam.   
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 This chapter is organized into six sections.  The first section reviews the literature 
on counter-radicalization programs with a focus on the government’s role and impact, as 
well as messenger types.  The second section proceeds to explain the structured, focused 
comparison methodology used to examine the argument and sets forth the questions used 
to conduct the structured comparison.298  In the third section, case study selection is 
explained, and the three cases – Quilliam, PET Dialogue Forum, and the Sakinah 
Campaign – are analyzed using the structured comparison methodology and standardized 
questions. The fourth section discusses the findings of the case study analysis, and in the 
fifth section, potential policy implications for the United States are outlined.  Finally, the 
conclusion offers closing thoughts on how a government connection can impact a 
counter-radicalization program and addresses the major findings.299 
 
Assessing the Field: Counter-radicalization Efforts  
Most literature on counter-radicalization efforts contends that visible government 
association with these efforts negatively impacts legitimacy, or similarly, that 
independence from government involvement strengthens a program’s legitimacy with its 
intended audience. 300  Howard Gambrill Clark emphasizes that independence from 
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secular and Western governments is particularly important.301   While specifically writing 
about U.S. efforts, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, argue that government “is not the 
most effective conveyor” of counter-radicalization messages.302  According to Alex 
Schmid, extremists might use a relationship with government to “undermine their 
[counter-radicalization program partners’] credibility” in debates.303   Individuals within 
this school of thought, who find government involvement negatively impacts efforts and 
messaging, tend to focus on the role and benefits of private and non-governmental 
organization efforts.304  
Many of these arguments use case study evidence to substantiate the claim that 
close government association hurts a counter-radicalization program’s relationship with 
the intended audience.  Some authors use cases where the government has been closely 
allied and hurt the program’s credibility, and others demonstrate that an independent 
program has been relatively successful.  Methods tend to be individual detailed case 
study analyses, brief descriptive examples, or multiple case study analyses without a 
structured comparative element.  
This school of thought has very valid arguments and case study evidence, but the 
literature fails to fully examine if differences arise because of connections to different 
forms of government (secular vs. Islamic law) or the construction of the counter-
radicalization program’s relationship with the government. Most authors agree that 
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association with a Western government will hurt a program, especially because Al-
Qaeda’s propaganda is so heavily directed against Western secular states.  Yet, this poses 
the question of whether states with authority in Islam might not be impacted in the same 
manner.  It is important to compare these two situations (connection with secular, 
Western vs. governed by Islamic law) because the outcome will indicate whether 
countries with different governments must develop different policies or program 
structures. Additionally, it is important to determine if the structure of the connection to 
government impacts the program.  If a particular structure makes it less evident that the 
government is connected to the program and if that program is succeeding in positive 
engagement, that information will have useful policy implications.   
Conversely, some government representatives and scholars find that the 
government can act as an effective messenger of counter-narratives without impacting the 
legitimacy of the message.305  These individuals often cite the extremists’ willingness to 
debate with individuals, whom they either know are government officials or believe are 
government officials, as a positive sign for counter-radicalization programs.306  Richard 
LaBron, the former coordinator for the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications at the Department of State, believes extremist engagement signals that 
the Digital Outreach Team, whose members openly identify as government officials, has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. military goes online to rebut extremists' messages,” The New 
York Times, November 17, 2011, accessed July 22, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/world/us-
military-goes-online-to-rebut-extremists.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Gilbert Ramsay, “Online arguments 
against al-Qaeda: An exploratory analysis,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6:1(March 2012): 66; Judith 
McHale and Richard LeBaron. “Digitally dissuading tomorrow's terrorists,” Politico, September 16, 2012, 
accessed September 2014. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81271_Page2.html 
306 Shanker and Schmitt, “U.S. military goes online to rebut extremists' messages;” Ramsay, “Online 
arguments against al-Qaeda: An exploratory analysis,” 66.   
	   94 
the ability to “hit a nerve” as messengers.307  This is an interesting point of view that 
differs greatly from those that call for counter-radicalization efforts to be independent or 
distanced from the government.  However, this perspective is typically based on 
discussions in chat rooms, whether positive or negative, and the ability for officials to 
chat with extremists online, and some officials have admitted the discussion is normally 
negative. 308  This perspective does not address how open government involvement could 
be affecting the legitimacy of the message and program.   Engagement of any kind does 
not necessarily indicate legitimacy or progress with the intended audience.    
In addition to discussing the role of government in counter-radicalization efforts, 
many authors detail the types of messengers, outside of government, that are most 
credible to the intended audience.   Many assert that religious scholars and Muslim 
community leaders, including local leaders, are credible and trusted voices with an 
understanding of Islam.309  Alex Schmid argues that “modern Muslims in Western 
Diasporas” should be the messengers because they are successful and well adjusted and 
can demonstrate engagement with the West while maintaining a Muslim culture and 
identity.310   These messengers are crucial to the success of the program because of their 
knowledge and experiences.  
Some individuals assert that former violent extremists are credible messengers, 
and several counter-radicalization programs, such as Google Ideas, employ former 
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extremists, which further exemplifies this perspective. 311  Others believe that victims of 
terrorist attacks can serve as credible messengers for counter-radicalization. 312   Each 
type of messenger proposed is supported by valid case study evidence, and some scholars 
even support multiples types of messengers; however, the literature does not analyze the 
various types of messengers across programs with different relationships to the 
government.  For example, one type of messenger might be credible in an independent 
program or a program with anonymity but lose credibility in another program with a 
structure more closely tied to a government.  
 This chapter will determine credible messenger types and provide a new 
perspective on the argument that open government involvement in counter-radicalization 
efforts can negatively impact legitimacy and credibility.  If my theory is true, I will find 
evidence in my case studies that points to a loss of credibility and engagement with the 
audience when a program is clearly linked to a government, particularly a secular 
government without authority in Islam.  There are several other variables that can impact 
a program’s connection with the intended audience, for example the content of the 
message, but this chapter’s scope is limited to the impact of government.   
Terms are used throughout this chapter that have been defined differently by 
various scholars in the field.  For the purposes of this chapter, construction or structure of 
the relationship with government describes how the government is connected to the 
program (government funding, program administration, bystander, etc.) and to what 
degree is the connection known to the public or obscured from public view.   Legitimacy 
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in this chapter means the program has the credibility and authority in Islam to be 
respected by the audience and to prompt positive engagement between the audience and 
the messengers. Also, counter-radicalization is defined as the efforts intended to prevent 
radicalization of vulnerable individuals and groups and any efforts intended to counter 
the violent extremist narrative.313  Finally, the intended audience refers to those 
individuals searching for an identity or community or those searching for more 
information on Islam, either to expand their knowledge of their current religion or for the 
purposes of converting.   
 
 
Methodology:  Structured, Focused Case Study Comparison 
 
Similar to Chapter 2, I utilize a structured, focused case study comparison to 
examine my argument because it allows me to investigate a variety of different programs 
and obtain similar, comparable information for analysis.  Other investigations of counter-
radicalization efforts typically utilize a single case study approach or multiple case study 
analysis without a standard set of questions applied to each case.  Both of these 
techniques are not conducive to performing a comparison.   I utilize a different approach 
with the structured case study comparison, which allows me to compare the same 
information across case studies to test my theory.  
I will ask the following six questions for each case study and analyze the findings:  
• What is the structure of the counter-radicalization program? 
• Who are the messengers of program’s counter-narrative?   
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• Does the program receive government support and/or funding?  
• What type of government is the program connected to or potentially connected to 
for support?  
• Is the intended audience in the Muslim community aware of the support that the 
program receives from the government?  
• Do people engage with the program’s material and/or messengers?  Are there any 
metrics of success?  
   
Current Counter-radicalization Programs 
In order to test my theory, I have selected three counter-radicalization programs in 
three different countries for my case studies.  The chosen programs are: the Sakinah 
Campaign in Saudi Arabia, the PET Dialogue Forum in Denmark, and the Quilliam 
Think-tank in Great Britain.  I selected these case studies because each has a uniquely 
structured connection to the government and each has a different degree of perceived 
independence from the government.   It is difficult to find an established counter-
radicalization program that does not have some degree of government involvement; 
therefore, each of these three programs has some form of connection. This means that my 
analysis will not include any findings on completely independent programs and how 
those programs might compare to those with some form of government connection.  I 
utilize programs from Western secular governments and a program from a country 
governed by Islamic Law to investigate if the difference in government impacts how the 
community perceives the connection to the government.  Additionally, each of the 
programs has existed for a minimum of four years with the most recent, the Dialogue 
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Forum, starting in 2008, so the programs have established themselves within the 
community and feedback is available on how engagement is working.   
 
Sakinah Campaign (Al-Sakina) 
The Sakinah Campaign is a non-governmental organization that administers a 
website and an online counter-radicalization engagement program.  The Sakinah 
Campaign, established in 2004, is structured into two interrelated branches, a research 
division and a division devoted to online counter-radicalization and engagement.314  The 
research division supports the online volunteers that engage with the extremists by 
providing current and detailed research on extremist interpretations, justifications and 
ideology to make the counter-narrative stronger. 315  The online volunteers engage with 
extremists in Al-Qaeda related chat rooms and websites to refute extremist 
misinterpretations and justifications for violence.316  The program also maintains English 
and Arabic websites with published chats between personnel and individuals questioning 
Islam and violent extremism, as well as other counter narrative and religious materials.317 
Religious scholars and leaders, academic leaders, psychiatrists, sociologists, and 
former extremists serve as messengers for the Sakinah Campaign.318  The program 
includes a separate women’s section to engage online with any potential female 
extremists.319 Some volunteers are associated with government ministries.320  However, it 
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is not clear if the identity of these messengers is always clearly announced online in their 
exchanges. 
Two opposing schools of thought have emerged on the degree of the Sakinah 
Campaign’s independence and support from the Saudi Arabian government.  One side 
argues that the Sakinah Campaign is an independent NGO “loosely affiliated”321 with and 
supported by the Saudi Arabian government (Boucek, Falconer).322  This side argues that 
the organization’s independent NGO status contributes to the program’s “relative 
legitimacy” and leads more individuals to engage with the volunteers.323  The opposing 
side contends that the Sakinah Campaign has a close association with the Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs or has been “adopted” by the Ministry.324  This side argues that the close 
association with the Ministry hurts the Campaign’s message and credibility.325  
Both schools agree that the Ministry of Islamic Affairs supports the program in 
some form.  Howard Gambrill Clark contends the program receives funding, while 
Christopher Boucek describes the relationship as “supported and encouraged” by the 
Ministry but does not explicitly state the type of support.326 Boucek has said that “the 
opaque nature of the relationship is not unusual.  Saudi Arabia is not a place where there 
are a lot of direct lines of control…the volunteers might be affiliated with a lot of 
different organizations and ministries, but that doesn’t mean it has official government 
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authorization.”327  However, the unclear relationship could also be intentional to preserve 
the credibility of the program and messengers, which might otherwise be compromised 
by an open and clearly defined tie to the government through funding.  Also, the 
program’s declared independence and status as an NGO helps the program maintain some 
distance from the government.     
According to a translated interview with the program’s founder and former 
director, Abd Al-Mun’im Al-Mushawwah, in a Saudi Arabian newspaper, the Minister of 
Islamic Affairs provides material support and exercises some influence over the activity 
of the program.328  However, the former director explains the program was started 
without government direction, and he stresses twice in the interview that the program is 
completely independent without government control.329  He also declares “relations with 
the Minister are on an advisory basis.”330  
The program is located in Saudi Arabia, which is an absolute monarchy governed 
by Islamic law - Sharia Law.331 Saudi Arabia has a very strict interpretation of Sharia 
Law, and the King consults with religious scholars (ulama) on policy decisions.332    Also, 
Saudi Arabian citizens are required to be Muslim, and the government controls the 
mosques and employs the imams.333   The government is highly involved in the religion 
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of the citizens and draws legitimacy from Islam. 334   The monarchy and royal family 
have considerable authority in interpreting Islam.   
The level of connection and the nature of the relationship with the government are 
not completely clear because of conflicting information; therefore, the intended audience 
cannot draw a clear connection or determine how close the government is to the program.   
It is not clearly explained if participating government employees would identify as 
government officials or Sakinah personnel.   There is a possibility that some individuals 
might question the program’s relationship with the government, but citizen suspicion of 
the program is not widely written about or documented.  However, this lack of 
documentation could be the result of tight government controls and a lack of openness 
from the Saudi government, which would have an interest in portraying the program as a 
success.  
The Sakinah Campaign publishes the online exchanges with individuals on the 
program websites, which provides evidence that people are engaging with the 
messengers.335 The Program claims to have turned 722 men and 155 women away from 
embracing violent extremism, but these metrics should be viewed with skepticism as they 
are self-reported and it is in the program’s interest to reflect success.336     Saudi Arabian 
newspapers have reported that the program has changed the beliefs of members of Al-
Qaeda.337 A less bias measure of success is the interest from other countries in the 
program’s structure and methods with the United States being one of the interested 
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countries.338  This interest from other countries indicates that others deem the program to 
be successful.   
 
Danish Security and Intelligence Service’s (PET) Dialogue Forum 
 In 2008, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) launched the 
Dialogue Forum against militant extremism as part of their larger counter-radicalization 
efforts; this is around the same time the PET noted a rise in the terrorist threat in 
Denmark.339  PET’s Centre for Prevention personnel organize biannual meetings on a 
regular basis with selected Muslim community leaders, including imams, teachers, 
housing associations, and welfare professionals.340  The Danish government believes 
these Muslim community leaders interact the most with individuals at risk of 
radicalization.341   All invited participants must not engage in violence or encourage 
violence.342  The program strives to bring together individuals to engage in discussion 
and “disagreeing dialogue,” 343 or debate, while promoting understanding of PET’s 
policies for in countering radicalization and terrorism.344 The program also facilitates a 
level of trust and communication between government officials and community leaders, 
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so that community leaders can help formulate effective counter-radicalization efforts.345  
PET also brings in subject matter experts to participate in some discussions to “challenge 
narratives through evidence based discussion.”346  The purpose of these discussions is to 
provide the community leaders with accurate information to include in their discussion 
with individuals from their communities and to educate them about radicalization.  
 The messengers for the program are the Muslim community leaders and 
participants that engage in the Dialogue Forum meetings, not the PET personnel. 
Participant names and all discussion topics are kept anonymous and secret to protect 
participants from potential negative impacts.347  These individuals return to their local 
communities with the information and new perspectives they have gained from the 
Forum, and they incorporate that information into their interactions with community 
members.    
 The Dialogue Forum is a program organized, funded and facilitated by the Danish 
Intelligence and Security Service.  The government openly acknowledges the program 
and describes it in a brief segment on their website.348  A budget or allocation amount is 
not listed on the Centre for Prevention website or the PET website, but the connection to 
government is not hidden.   
 The counter-radicalization program is connected to the Danish government, which 
is a constitutional monarchy with a civil law legal system.349  Denmark practices 
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democracy and exercises freedom of religion. 350 It is a secular country without 
involvement or authority in a particular religion. All religions are respected and citizens 
can elect to participate in any religion.351  The government does not draw legitimacy from 
religion.   
As noted earlier, the government acknowledges the Dialogue Forum, but the 
participant list is anonymous and the discussion topics are kept secret.352  Open source 
research yields little information on the program due to its anonymous nature.353    
Therefore, the intended audience does not know who the messengers are unless the 
messengers choose to identify themselves as participants in the meetings.  Julian Brett’s 
interviews with program participants revealed that some have told community members 
about their participation in the Dialogue Forum meetings, which at times sparked larger 
discussions on counter-radicalization.354 Additionally, the program maintains anonymity 
and secrecy to avoid becoming a “political platform.”355  
 Due to the anonymity of the messengers and the sensitivity around the program, 
the messengers cannot be traced, so it is difficult to measure engagement between the 
messengers and the intended audience.   However, Julian Brett’s interviews with 
participants in the program provide insight into the success of the program.  Many 
individuals interviewed were open with their participation and only one reported 
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encountering a negative reaction.356   Additionally, the program has been meeting for 
over four years and continues to have regular participation from the selected leaders, 
which indicates the participants (messengers) find the program and information to be 
valuable.357  Participants have expressed that the discussions on Danish foreign policy 
have been very helpful and informative, and many individuals expressed that the 
interaction among participants was very beneficial.358   
 
Quilliam  
 Quilliam is a counter extremism think tank founded by former Islamic extremists 
in Great Britain to challenge violent extremist material and interpretations of Islam. 359 
Quilliam’s objective is to “inspire new thought-trends for existing grassroots bodies,” and 
the staff utilizes a variety of techniques to broadcast their research and counter-
narratives.360 Personnel conduct events and outreach at universities and community 
centers presenting their papers and research findings as well as engaging in debates.361  
The think-tank maintains a blog and regularly produces publications and press releases, 
and Quilliam’s leaders have also made high-profile media appearances.362  All of these 
products and events are directed at four audiences with different goals.  Governments are 
targeted to influence counter terrorism and counter extremism policy, and Quilliam 
targets the media to enhance and inform their coverage of terrorism topics.363  The third 
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target audience is “non-Islamist civil society” to educate them on the “difference between 
Islamism and Islam.”364  Finally, Quilliam targets extremists groups and individuals 
following extremist ideologies with a goal to “undermine their networks, communication 
strategies and their political ideologies.”365   This last target audience is particularly 
important for counter-radicalization.  Quilliam challenges extremist ideology and 
interpretations and presents a counter-narrative.   
 The messengers and authors of the Quilliam products and counter-narrative are a 
diverse group of individuals.  The staff includes ex-extremists and ex-Islamists, academic 
scholars, and religious scholars.  Also, Quilliam is open to people of a variety of 
religions.366  A review of staff biographies illustrates that most of the personnel have a 
history involving Islamism and many of them are first and second generation British 
citizens.367  
 Quilliam has a direct connection to the government through funding and 
consulting work.  The program is funded by private donations and government grants.368  
Quilliam received nearly one million pounds in grant funds from the British government 
in 2009 - 660,000 from the Home Office, 140,000 from the Foreign Office and another 
100,000 from the Home Office in the following fiscal year.369  The program had the 
potential to receive additional funding based on performance and progress.370   Quilliam 
personnel also consult for the government, specifically on counter-extremism for the 
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security divisions.371   Yet, Quilliam leadership contends the program is independent 
from political parties and from influence on their research.372   
 The British government is a constitutional monarchy with a common law legal 
system.373  It is a secular government and does not draw legitimacy from religion.  The 
British government and citizens emphasize democratic values and principals, which 
includes the freedom of religion.   The government respects all religions and does not 
have authority in any particular religion. Beyond religion, the British government is 
closely allied with the United States and traditionally perceived as part of the secular 
Western democracies.   
 The intended audience is fully aware of the program’s connection to the 
government through funding and advising work.   Both topics are openly discussed and 
found on the Quilliam’s website and published in news material.    Recent reports on the 
Quilliam Foundation indicate that the association with the government has harmed the 
Foundation’s reputation and credibility with the intended audience.  A representative 
from the Muslim Council of Britain called them “ a government stooge” with “very little 
credibility among British Muslims.”374   A 2009 piece in The Times quotes a government 
minister as stating that Quilliam has “very little support in the mainstream Muslim 
community” and that “the Government knows if you want a Muslim to say pro-
government things, then Quilliam in the answer.”375  Both quotes indicate the program 
has lost credibility as an independent source and counter-narrative.   
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 Quilliam also lost credibility and support with the intended Muslim audience due 
to close ties with right wing media and political parties.376 The right wing media is 
unpopular with the mainstream Muslim audience because they traditionally are associated 
with being “anti-multicultural” and stating negative “criticism of Muslims.”377   Muslim 
audiences associate Quilliam with the government and the right wing media and no 
longer judge them to be relatable and credible.  These reports and criticisms of Quilliam 
suggest that the counter-narrative and counter-radicalization portion of the program 
meant to undermine Islamic extremist ideology are not engaging the intended audience 
because they have lost legitimacy and independence.   
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Discussion of Case Study Findings  
Clarity of Government Connection  
As Table 1 illustrates, all three cases examined receive government support and 
funding to some extent, whether the program is run through the government or receives 
government support. The level of visible connection to the government and the structure 
of that relationship are what make the three programs different. A comparison of the 
three case studies reveals that problems arise when the intended audience can draw a 
clear and traceable relationship between a secular government and a counter-
radicalization program’s messengers.   For example, Quilliam appears to have suffered 
the most from a legitimacy problem and they have the clearest and most publicized 
connection to government through funding and consulting. The PET Dialogue Forum is a 
government program but the messengers cannot be directly traced back to the program or 
the government, so the messengers have continued to successfully engage with the target 
audience.  The Sakinah Campaign also receives government support but conflicting 
information on the level and type of support keeps the program’s relationship with the 
government uncertain, which could be intentional to maintain credibility of the program 
or could simply be a result of the governance style.  
The media and publicity of the program also impact the degree of visibility of the 
government connection.  A comparison of the case studies, summarized in Table 1, 
indicates that the more publicity a program received and the more involved with the 
media, the more issues the program had with maintaining legitimacy and connecting with 
the audience because it became more obvious that the program and messengers were 
connected to the government.   This was particularly evident in programs located in 
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Western secular countries with freedom of the press and a more open internet.  The PET 
Dialogue Forum is not covered in the media and very little information is available about 
the program on the internet, and they maintain a successful level of engagement.  On the 
other hand, Quilliam is widely covered in the media and even acknowledges targeting the 
media, and Quilliam’s engagement with the target audience has suffered.  The Sakinah 
Program is covered in the media, but much of the media’s information is controlled by 
the Saudi Arabian government or is obscure enough to make the connection to the 
government unclear.    
 
Messengers 
 The Sakinah Campaign and Quilliam both utilize ex-Islamic extremists and 
religious authorities or scholars as messengers.  For the Sakinah Campaign, these types of 
messengers seem to be working to engage potential extremists, particularly when paired 
with the consistently updated research on violent extremist justifications and 
interpretations. Sakinah’s published conversations and accounts of chat room discussions 
provide evidence for this engagement, but they should be viewed with some skepticism 
since it is in the best interest of the program to promote successes. For Quilliam, the use 
of the exact same types of messengers is failing to engage the targeted potential 
extremists and those individuals and groups already adhering to an extremist ideology.   
The failure stems from the larger issue of the program’s connection to the British 
government and particularly the founders’ perceived ties to both right wing media and 
politics.  With the program negatively connected to the government, the messengers, who 
openly identify as Quilliam scholars, are then negatively associated with the government.   
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The PET Dialogue Forum works with community leaders – religious leaders, 
teachers, etc.- who then become messengers within their own communities and 
organizations.  These messengers are already engaging with the intended audience in 
their everyday positions, and they are not clearly tied to the government-funded program. 
The participants also are not necessarily given a scripted message or platform but are 
provided with information and exposed to ideas that help them develop their own 
arguments and message for use in their communities.  In this way, the government is seen 
more as a facilitator of discussion.    
 
Quilliam vs. Sakinah Campaign  
  Out of the three case studies examined, the Sakinah Campaign and Quilliam have 
the most similarities in terms of structural connection to the government (see Table 1 
above for summary and comparison of the two cases).  The Sakinah Campaign and 
Quilliam are both NGO’s that receive some level of government support and funding, yet 
they have different levels of success in engaging with their intended audiences and 
Muslim communities.  The evidence on audience engagement described above suggests 
that the Sakinah Campaign is more successful in maintaining legitimacy and engaging 
with the intended audience.    Conversely, Quilliam struggles to engage with the Muslim 
community and the target audience even though they are able to successfully interact 
with their other two target audiences, the government and the media.  
 One factor that contributes to the differences in engagement between these two 
programs is the transparency of the program’s relationship with the government.  
Quilliam’s government funding and consulting work is clearly documented in the media, 
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on the web, and in government documents.  Even the program’s funding amounts are 
listed for public consumption.  The Sakinah Campaign’s relationship with the 
government is less documented and somewhat less transparent in the connection between 
the messengers and the government.  As indicated during the case study, scholars 
studying the Sakinah Campaign seem to disagree over the level of independence the 
program has from the government and the type of support it receives.  After exploring 
evidence on the Sakinah Campaign, one interview with a former Director of the 
Campaign portrayed a closer connection to government.  The lack of clarity and publicity 
surrounding the program’s connection to the government could be intentional to preserve 
the program’s independent status.  Furthermore, the specific types of material support and 
possible funding the Sakinah Campaign receives are never clearly documented for public 
consumption like Quilliam’s funding amounts. 
Perhaps more importantly, the two programs reside in countries with very 
different forms of government, which could explain the difference in the level of 
credibility and engagement with the intended audience.  Saudi Arabia’s government 
follows Islamic law and therefore, has greater knowledge and authority in Islam.  The 
British government is secular and seen as part of the West with no connection or 
authority in Islam. The Sakinah Campaign appears to maintain more credibility and 
positive engagement with the audience than Quilliam because the government draws 
legitimacy and authority from Islam.  
Potential Policy Implications for the United States  
 The findings are informative for the United States government as agencies work 
to develop and refine their counter-radicalization efforts.  According to the case study 
findings, as a Western secular government, the United States should strive to formulate 
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programs that mask government involvement or at least protect the identities of the 
messengers working with the government.  As the case study results illustrate, it is not 
the government’s connection to the program that appears to be crucial to legitimacy but 
instead it is the government’s connection with the messenger delivering the counter-
narrative that is important.  
 There are also immediate policy implications for counter-radicalization programs 
the United States already has in place.  For example, two of our international counter-
radicalization efforts, the Digital Outreach Team from the Department of State and the 
Digital Engagement Team based out of Central Command (CENTCOM), openly identify 
as United States government and CENTCOM employees.378   Based on the findings from 
the case studies, the clear connection between the messengers (members of each team) 
and the United States government could be negatively impacting the connection they 
have with the intended audience in the chat rooms and websites they visit.  The greater 
the distance the government can put between itself and the messengers, the more likely 
the program will experience positive engagement with individuals.   
 Non-governmental organizations can also draw lessons from the findings, 
particularly those findings related to the Sakinah Campaign and Quilliam.  Openly 
accepting government funding in Western, secular states can drastically impact a 
program’s credibility with the intended audience, particularly if the program is seen as 
aligned with a particular political wing.   Funding is not as much of an issue in the United 
States because the government cannot openly fund NGOs that appear to be supporting a 
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particular interpretation of Islam or any religion. 379  However, other forms of 
government support, such as praise or any type of publicized connection, will harm the 
program and should be considered by the NGO.   Non-governmental organizations in 
secular, Western countries will achieve better results if they maintain political neutrality 
and distance from the government.   
 I was not able to control for the type of messenger delivering the counter-
narrative across the case studies. Therefore, I could not draw clear policy implications for 
whether the messenger type matters and what types of messengers possess the greatest 
credibility and are most effective in conveying a counter-message.  However, I was able 
to determine that local community leaders, as used in PET Dialogue Forum, and ex-
Islamic extremists and religious authorities have the potential to be effective messengers 
when not clearly connected to the government. This analysis illustrates potential 
messenger options and also indicates that Western governments would benefit from 
acting behind the scenes in a facilitator role rather than openly using employees as 
messengers.  This information should be taken into consideration when designing and 
developing counter-radicalization efforts. 
Conclusion 
 The findings of this paper partially support the argument that an obvious 
connection between the government and a counter-radicalization program negatively 
impacts the relationship the program has with its intended audience.  However, the 
findings indicate that an apparent connection between the government and the 
messengers is what actually impacts the audience, not the connection with the program in 
general.  When the audience could not identify which individuals or messengers were 
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connected to the government, as was the case for the PET Dialogue Forum, the program 
was successful in maintaining legitimacy and engaging in positive interactions.  
Conversely, those messengers that were clearly connected to the government suffered 
legitimacy issues and failed to produce positive engagement, as the Quilliam case study 
exemplifies.  
 Additionally, the case study comparison and findings support the argument that 
the type of government involved in the connection impacts how the audience perceives a 
program.  The comparison between the Sakinah Campaign and Quilliam proves this 
theory.   Quilliam, tied to a secular Western government, was negatively impacted by an 
apparent government connection, whereas the Sakinah Campaign, which is tied to the 
government to some uncertain degree, did not suffer the same credibility and engagement 
issues.   
 Counter-radicalization programs will continue to be an important element of 
combating the terrorist threat, particularly since homegrown terrorism has increased in 
Western countries.   Based on these findings, messengers for counter-radicalization 
programs in Western, secular countries should not be openly tied to the government.   
More attention should be focused on developing program structures that distance the 
messengers from these governments while maintaining the intent and effort. This is not to 
say that Western governments should not initiate or administer counter-radicalization 
programs, but the programs must take into account these structural considerations.  The 
United States should take this into consideration when evaluating current program 
progress and future counter-radicalization efforts.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has taken significant 
steps to counter terrorism with emphasis internationally on military force and 
domestically on policing and intelligence efforts.  However, it is important that the 
United States focus more on the actual radicalization process, prior to an individual 
reaching the point of violent extremism and engaging in terrorist activity, in addition to 
the current kinetic and policing efforts. The United States has developed some efforts to 
counter and prevent radicalization, but these efforts must be increased and enhanced to 
more effectively stem the process leading to violent extremism.  The United States 
currently expends a large amount of resources on countering terrorist attacks through 
defense and protective measures and a relatively small amount on combating the 
radicalization process that leads up to the terrorist attack.  The United States must strike a 
greater balance in the attention and resources allocated to these two areas, or the security 
community will continue to be reactive to the issue of terrorism rather than proactive in 
preventing radicalization to violent extremism.   
 
Overview of Findings 
The first chapter was an analysis of female motivations to radicalize to violent 
extremism.  This included an assessment of the literature on female motivations to 
determine the main theories and an evaluation of the applicability of these theories to four 
Western female case studies – Muriel Degauque, Roshonara Choudhry, Malika El Aroud, 
and Colleen LaRose.  The four broad categories within the literature were: political, 
religious, coercion and personal.  Personal motivations consisted of revenge and grief, 
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trauma, regaining honor, and struggling for equality.  The case study findings clearly 
demonstrated that trauma, particularly secondary traumatization, is a key motivator to 
violent extremism and is linked to a motivation to obtain revenge for the victimized - 
perceived or actual - group.  The analysis also indicated that regaining honor, a 
motivation typically attributed to societies with strict societal roles and norms, could be 
present in Western cases; however, the evidence is based on potential signs and indicators 
not stated testimony or interviews from the extremists, so a solid link cannot be 
established. Political and religious motivations were present in all of the assessed cases 
and coercion was not found in any of the cases.  The findings of this chapter provide 
insight into the areas that should be addressed within a counter-narrative, specifically for 
secondary traumatization.  Materials demonstrating victimized Muslims motivate the 
women, therefore the counter-radicalization programs and corresponding counter-
narrative must address this issue.    
Inspirational terrorist leaders greatly impact the radicalization process.  The 
second chapter examined the characteristics of inspirational terrorist leaders with an 
analysis of two case studies: Anwar al-Awlaki and Abdullah Azzam.  A review of the 
literature on leadership, terrorist and other types of leaders, established three 
characteristics for use in the case study analysis.  These characteristics were: charisma, 
effective communication, and credibility or authority.  Each leader was analyzed using 
these characteristics to determine the applicability and then two compare the findings 
from the two leaders. Both of the leaders conformed to the literature on charisma and 
credibility, but only al-Awlaki followed the literature on effective communication for a 
modern audience. The results had policy implications for targeted killings and counter-
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violent extremism efforts.  The findings indicated that these leaders can inspire 
individuals to radicalize to violent extremism long after they have died, and their 
messages can be distorted after their death; therefore, targeted killings likely will not stop 
their influence without an accompanying counter-messaging effort.   
The final chapter assesses whether or not a government connection with a 
counter-radicalization program impacts the legitimacy of the program, and if the type of 
government has an impact on the legitimacy if a connection is evident.  Three programs 
were selected – Quilliam, Dialogue Forum, and the Sakinah Campaign.  These programs 
had different structures and were located in countries with varying types of government.  
The analysis results provided evidence that the credibility and legitimacy of counter-
radicalization programs are negatively impacted by an evident government connection to 
the messengers, not necessarily a connection to the program itself.  Also, the analysis 
confirmed that the type of government involved does impact the legitimacy if there is an 
evident connection with governments based in Islamic law maintaining greater legitimacy. 
These findings have direct implications for the structure of counter-radicalization efforts 
in the United States, some of which openly associate with the government.    
The three chapters all provide evidence on a collective level that the terrorist 
message, conveyed through propaganda and communication, is a dominant factor in the 
radicalization process. The first chapter demonstrates that terrorist propaganda exhibiting 
victimized Muslims does have an impact in motivating individuals, and it also provides 
insight into the types of motivations that terrorists exploit.  The chapter on inspirational 
leaders supplies information on how these leaders communicate and connect with the 
audience.  This information can be used to improve the communication techniques for 
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counter-radicalization programs and to disrupt the terrorist leader’s message.  Finally, the 
chapter on program structure and messengers provides evidence that the actual 
messengers for a program should not be clearly connected to the government.    The 
findings from each chapter provide a better understanding of specific aspects of 
radicalization and existing counter-radicalization programs that can be used to combat the 
terrorist message.  
 
Limitations  
The research did have some limitations based on availability of information.  This 
primarily applies to the first chapter focusing on female motivations and to some degree 
to the final chapter on counter-radicalization program links with the government.  For the 
first chapter, the case study information for each woman was limited to open source 
research, and did not include interviews as many scholars have done with individual case 
studies.  This was due to time and resource constraints.  Also, the suicide bombing case 
study, Muriel Degauque, was limited to information from news interviews with her 
family and other materials published after her death, rather than first-hand testimony or 
interviews.  This limitation was unavoidable given the nature of the case.  The third 
chapter faced some information restrictions due to level of secrecy surrounding the 
program for the Dialogue Forum and due to the level of information control conducted by 
the government for the Sakinah Campaign.  However, these limitations had minimal 
impact on the analysis. 
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Future Research 
In the future, research on radicalization should continue to look at the impact of 
inspirational leaders after they have been killed, particularly the impact of Anwar al-
Awlaki.  This paper included al-Awlaki in the discussion of inspirational leaders, but a 
study should be conducted after more time has passed to look back on the impact, or lack 
of impact, al-Awlaki has after his death.  For example, will his materials continue to 
prompt individuals to act years after his death when his materials and cultural references 
are not as current?  
 Future research on inspirational leaders, female motivations and counter-
radicalization program structure should be examined beyond violent Islamic extremism 
and compared to determine commonalities in the radicalization process across ideologies. 
Violent Islamic extremism is not the only form of violent extremism and is not the only 
form of violent extremism that is a threat to national security.  The topics examined in the 
previous chapters would benefit from a comparison with other forms of violent 
extremism to determine if there are overlaps in the CVE efforts that can or should be 
taken and to further the understanding of radicalization more broadly.  For example, what 
similarities and differences exist in the three identified leadership characteristics for 
single-issue extremist leaders and Islamic extremist leaders? What motivations prompt 
women to act in right-wing extremist groups?  
 
Closing Thoughts  
In closing, the findings from this thesis and the proposed future research should 
be taken into consideration as policymakers consider new programs or improvements to 
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existing programs to counter radicalization.  The United States has a formal counter-
radicalization strategy and some programs directed at combatting radicalization to violent 
extremism, but they are relatively new and still developing.  This thesis is not implying 
that the United States does not conduct counter-radicalization activities, but rather intends 
to further the study of radicalization.  The goal is to contribute meaningful research and 
analysis that will help the United States develop more effective and successful programs 
based off of this enhanced understanding.   
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